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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: A FOURTH AMENDMENT
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE IN PUBLIC
Rachel Levinson-Waldman∗
INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the range and capabilities of easily available
technologies have expanded at an astonishing pace. The beeper gave way to the
flip phone, which has largely been replaced by the “smartphone,” a minicomputer that fits in the palm of your hand and is more powerful than the desktop
machine of the 1980s.1 Paper maps are increasingly rare, replaced by built-in
Global Positioning System (GPS) devices or the ubiquitous smartphone. The
days of having to keep change in a glove compartment to pay a toll attendant are
long past; instead, an EZ-Pass reader enables drivers to travel seamlessly across
multiple states and pay the charges directly from an online account.
These and other technologies, which are valuable to civilians and law
enforcement alike, also enable a granular view of citizens’ movements and
associations in public over long periods of time at a relatively cheap cost. The
2002 movie Minority Report,2 which seemed wildly futuristic at the time,
effectively predicted many of the technologies now available to police at the

∗ Rachel Levinson-Waldman is Senior Counsel to the Liberty and National Security Program at the
Brennan Center for Justice. This has been a multi-year project; I began working on this paper while I was
pregnant with my second child and he can now ride a scooter. I therefore owe numerous debts of gratitude. For
countless conversations and feedback on drafts, I am grateful to my current and former Brennan Center
colleagues Liza Goitein, Faiza Patel, Michael Price, Michael German, and Amos Toh. For extremely able
research assistance, I am grateful to Erica Posey, Andrew Lindsay, Brynne O'Neal, Jeremy Carp, Patricia
Stottlemyer, Andrew Lehmann, Andrew Nellis, and Charlotte Lunday. For participating in discussions and
roundtable meetings and offering comments on drafts, I am grateful to Marc Blitz, Danielle Citron, David Cole,
Laura Donohue, Joshua Dratel, Hanni Fakhoury, Harley Geiger, Marcia Hofmann, Margaret Hu, Orin Kerr,
David Lipson, David Robinson, Julian Sanchez, Stephen Schulhofer, Nick Selby, Christopher Slobogin, Jay
Stanley, Amie Stepanovich, Daniel Weitzner, Nathan Wessler, Ben Wizner, and Harlan Yu. Finally, I wish to
thank the Emory Law Journal, in particular Nathan North and Grace Zoller for their fine editing and Katya
Keremidchieva and Mary Grace Gallagher for their excellent work on the February 2016 symposium.
1 See John Sheesley, The 80’s Supercomputer that’s Sitting in Your Lap, TECHREPUBLIC (Oct. 13, 2008,
8:47 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/classics-rock/the-80s-supercomputer-thats-sitting-in-your-lap/.
2 MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).

LEVINSON-WALDMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

528

2/22/2017 1:18 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:527

click of a button: drones, facial recognition scanners, vehicle trackers, and
more.3
Where law enforcement is involved, these powerful new technologies also
raise questions about how their use can be harmonized with the U.S.
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”4 Under what circumstances does an eye in the sky (or on
a pole, or inside your phone) constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment—
and thus presumptively require a warrant—when it is used for public
surveillance?
It seems inconceivable that the Founders, who could fairly be described as
obsessed with Americans’ right to be let alone, could have envisioned, let alone
endorsed, the degree and depth of intrusion into individuals’ lives that is enabled
by present-day surveillance technologies.5 At the same time, it is notoriously
difficult to articulate when surveillance in public works a constitutional violation
and when it is simply the price for leaving the house. While the judiciary is
nowhere near consensus, courts are finding that some public manifestations of
this new, digitally-enabled tracking are so inimical to any standard notions of
privacy that the Fourth Amendment imposes limits on their use, as discussed in
further detail below.
The home has always been sacrosanct territory for the Fourth Amendment.
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court began to expand its conceptions of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections beyond the doorstep. In United States v. Katz,
involving a payphone (then a cutting-edge technology), the Court laid the
groundwork for a doctrine holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
individuals from police intrusion when the intrusion violates a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”6 A couple of decades later, the Supreme Court
confronted another novel technology, which police were using to tail criminal
suspects: the beeper.
3 See Michael Casey, Facial Recognition Software Is Scanning You Where You Least Expect It, CBS NEWS
(June 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/facial-recognition-software-is-scanning-you-whereyou-least-expect-it/; Drones & MiniDrones, BROOKSTONE, http://www.brookstone.com/drones-minidrones (last
visited Mar. 16, 2016); Jeremy Scahill & Margot Williams, Stingrays: A Secret Catalogue of Government Gear
for Spying on Your Cellphone, INTERCEPT (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:23 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/12/17/asecret-catalogue-of-government-gear-for-spying-on-your-cellphone/.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND.
L.J. 979, 989–991 (2011).
6 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In two key Supreme Court cases, police officers planted beeper devices in
suspects’ cars and used their signals to follow the car when a close physical tail
was impractical or would have revealed the surveillance.7 In these cases, the
Court concluded that because the police could have freely followed and
observed the suspects on public roads and highways without getting a warrant,
using a beeper to make the job a little easier did not sound constitutional alarms.8
Although the Court warned that its analysis might not hold if the police
undertook dragnet surveillance, its reasoning has long been used as support for
the broad proposition that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s
movements in public space.9
Of course, the stock-in-trade of good policing often involves the real-time
observation of people going about their daily business. This kind of visual
observation, while potentially intrusive or discomfiting to the subject or
passersby, does not raise constitutional issues.10 It is also, however, cost- and
resource-intensive.11 These costs have historically required law enforcement
agencies to make critical judgments about what types of police work and
surveillance to undertake, and they have acted as an effective brake on at least
some kinds of government overreach. Practical limitations on government
surveillance in public offered “structural privacy,” privacy arising not from
legislative or judicial decisionmaking, but from the physical and technical
limitations on carrying out long-term, wide-range surveillance of multiple
persons or areas.12
Enter digital technology. As surveillance techniques grow ever more
technologically sophisticated, the quantum of data that is easily available grows
as well, while the cost of obtaining, keeping, and analyzing it generally drops.
At the same time, “our historical expectations of privacy do not change or
somehow weaken simply because we now happen to use modern technology to
engage in activities in which we have historically maintained protected privacy

7 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984) (considering the constitutionality of using a
beeper for surveillance); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983) (considering the constitutionality of
using a concealed beeper to trace a can of chloroform from its place of purchase to a secluded cabin).
8 Karo, 468 U.S. at 721; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 273–74 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded,
565 U.S. 1189 (2012); Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Walker,
771 F. Supp. 2d 803, 810 (W.D. Mich. 2011).
10 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
11 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing
the costs and burdens of traditional surveillance methods).
12 See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1607–08 (2007).
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interests.”13 How, then, is the judiciary “to adapt traditional Fourth Amendment
concepts to the Government’s modern, more sophisticated investigative
tools”?14
This Article proposes one way to meet this challenge. Existing case law, seen
through a new lens, provides the blueprint for a workable, comprehensive
mechanism for applying the Fourth Amendment to digital age public
surveillance technologies.15 This approach aggregates factors courts have
already identified as relevant to their Fourth Amendment analysis, but in an ad
hoc manner, and transforms them into a more rigorous, replicable approach.
These factors are: (1) the duration of the surveillance; (2) the lowering of
structural barriers to pervasive surveillance, reflected in the greatly reduced cost
of tracking; (3) the recording of an individual’s or group’s movements; (4) the
elicitation of information from within a protected space such as a home; and, as
appropriate, (5) whether the technology undermines core constitutional rights
and (6) whether surveillance technologies are piggy-backed on each other.
Pulling out and articulating these factors, and analyzing how and why they
should be considered, seeks to add rigor to the improvisatory method that has
defined the judiciary’s consideration of these questions.
Once the Fourth Amendment is triggered, the Constitution generally requires
police to get a warrant, which must meet the particularity standard.16 That will
usually be possible through careful ex ante and ex post tailoring; where it is not,
that use of the surveillance technology may not be compatible with the
Constitution. In addition, courts must be alert to attempts to justify a wide swath
of surveillance activities on the grounds that they satisfy a “special need,” an
exception to the warrant requirement that could quickly swallow the rule.17
13

United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 524–25 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir.
2015), rev’d in part, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
15 There are other mechanisms for approaching surveillance reform as well. Most notably, Christopher
Slobogin has proposed practical legislative methods and offered the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings
for doing so, including shifting to an administrative law rather than constitutional law framework. CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007);
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016). This piece does not take a
position on those proposals, which are also worth serious attention.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” (emphasis added)).
17 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (observing that the Court has permitted exceptions to
the warrant requirement “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
14
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***
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of the
courts’ evolution on the Fourth Amendment implications of surveillance in the
public space, from initial hints that dragnet surveillance might be problematic to
growing recognition that modern methods of information capture and public
space surveillance pose privacy concerns of constitutional magnitude. Part II
outlines a new, multi-factor approach for both courts and law enforcement to use
in assessing whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated by surveillance in
public, drawing on existing case law and various scholarly approaches. It
assesses how a warrant for surveillance in public can meet the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity standard and explores why the special needs
exception to the warrant requirement will rarely come into play. It also briefly
addresses the circumstances in which the First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment may provide avenues for relief. Finally, Part III uses several case
studies to explore how this approach plays out in the context of specific
technologies that facilitate surveillance in public.
I. SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE COURTS
This section comprises two main parts. First, it briefly reviews the early
stages of the Supreme Court’s modern privacy jurisprudence, starting with the
Court’s seminal 1967 decision in United States v. Katz.18 Second, it canvasses
both the technology behind and the current legal treatment of seven major
surveillance tools: GPS automobile tracking, cellular phones, video surveillance
cameras, drones, license plate readers, body-worn cameras, and biometric
identification technologies. In doing so, it demonstrates that the era of “dragnettype law enforcement practices,” about which the Supreme Court warned in
United States v. Knotts, has come to pass.19
A. The Supreme Court’s Early Privacy Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court launched its modern privacy jurisprudence in 1967, with
United States v. Katz.20 Trying to catch Charles Katz in the act of placing an
illegal bet, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) used a wiretap to listen in

and probable-cause requirement impracticable’” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment))).
18 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
20 389 U.S. at 359.
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on a call he made from a public pay phone booth.21 The agents did not get a
warrant for the wiretap, reasoning that because the pay phone was in public and
Katz could be seen through its glass walls, he was taking the risk that someone
might overhear the conversation.22 In other words, because a member of the
public could listen in, so could the police.
The Supreme Court saw it differently. The Court rejected its previous,
crabbed reading of the Constitution, which had held that the Fourth Amendment
protected only private spaces, such as homes, and only against physical
intrusion.23 In Justice Stewart’s ringing words in Katz, “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.”24 Thus, “what [a person] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”25 The fact that Katz had shut the telephone booth door showed his
intent to keep the conversation private.
Katz established for the first time that individuals had rights to privacy that
were not dependent on whether a physical locale had been breached. In an
influential concurrence, Justice Harlan set out a two-prong test inquiring into an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”: first, does that individual have
a subjective expectation of privacy in a particular activity? And second, if so, is
society prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable?26
As the Supreme Court continued to hear challenges to law enforcement’s use
of surveillance and tracking technologies in public, it built on Harlan’s
formulation, inquiring into both the subjective expectation of privacy and
society’s acceptance of that expectation. At the same time, the Court absorbed
Harlan’s caveat that while the Constitution “protects people, not places,” the
process of determining the scope of that protection “requires reference to a
‘place.’”27 As a result, courts were initially relatively dismissive of claims for
privacy in public spaces,28 focusing instead on the moment when surveillance
21

Id. at 348.
Id. at 352.
23 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–
66 (1928).
24 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
25 Id. at 351–52.
26 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”);
United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2003) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital
mailroom open to the public).
22
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strays into a private home29 or its curtilage,30 or, in some circumstances, a private
office31 or locker room.32
In United States v. Knotts, for example, the Court upheld the police’s
warrantless use of a hidden beeper to track a suspect’s car down public roads.33
Because anyone on the roads could see the driver, he had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in his movements.34 By contrast, the Court ruled the
following year that when a beeper is taken inside a private home and reveals
information that otherwise would have required a warrant to obtain, it is a
search.35
Compared to today’s technology, however, the beeper was practically
primitive. While it allowed law enforcement to do relatively precise tracking and
to locate a person or item out of direct eyesight, it still required constant
attention.36 If the officer or agent lost the beeper’s position, he would have to
return to its last known location and attempt to find it manually via radio
receiver.37 The Knotts majority presciently observed that compared to this
painstaking, resource-intensive, individualized surveillance, “dragnet-type law
enforcement practices” could change the Fourth Amendment calculus.38
29 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search . . . .” (citation omitted));
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (holding that the monitoring of a beeper inside a private home
raised constitutional concerns).
30 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“We therefore regard the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for
Fourth Amendment purposes.’”).
31 See, e.g., O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Offices and other workplaces are
among the areas in which individuals may enjoy . . . a reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Richards v. Cty. of
Los Angeles, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1185–86 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (surreptitious video recording of a “dispatch”
room shared by public employees violated Fourth Amendment).
32 See, e.g., Brannum v. Overton Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 496–97 (6th Cir. 2008) (videotaping students
in a school locker room violates reasonable expectation of privacy).
33 460 U.S. at 285.
34 Id.
35 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S 705, 716–17 (1984).
36 See Richard H. McAdams, Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth
Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 314 (1985) (“[B]eepers require continued observation to discover
someone’s identity, route, and final destination.”).
37 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 (describing beepers as “radio transmitter[s], usually battery operated, which
emit[] periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver”).
38 Id. at 284; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that Knotts reserved
the question of “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen” for another day, and observing that “26 years after
Knotts, GPS technology, even in its present state of evolution, quite simply and matter-of-factly forces the
issue”).
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B. Courts and Modern Surveillance Technologies: A Brief Overview
These practices are upon us. They represent a new era in sophistication and
in the government’s ability to track individuals’ locations, activities, and
associations via public space surveillance, often at a fraction of the cost it would
take for individual officers to do the job. And they require a new approach to
ensure that an individual “does not leave his privacy behind when he walks out
his front door.”39 This section provides a brief overview of the public tracking
and surveillance technologies that are now commonly known to be in law
enforcement’s hands and an outline of the current doctrinal landscape.
1. GPS Automobile Tracking
GPS devices use satellites to calculate their location with precision.40 While
making car trips easier and faster, they also enable law enforcement agencies to
track vehicles.41 Standalone GPS units can be surreptitiously attached to cars,42
or the police can get access to data from built-in devices.43 Once attached, a GPS
device reports the location of the vehicle with precision and in real time.44 GPS
devices are also used in cell phones to help calculate location for a variety of
purposes.45
From relatively early on, courts have recognized that GPS allows for precise
tracking on a monumental scale. In 2009, for instance, New York’s highest court
considered the warrantless use of a GPS device to monitor a car’s location for
sixty-five days, observing:
GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity, it
facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which the
39

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
See How Does GPS Work?, PHYSICS.ORG, www.physics.org/article-questions.asp?id=55 (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., Alyson Sheppard, Police Shoot Cars with GPS Tags to Reduce High-Speed Chases, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/news/police-shoot-carswith-gps-tags-to-reduce-high-speed-chases-16127245.
43 See, e.g., Ben Wojdyla, Your Car Is Spying on You—But Whom Is It Spying For?, POPULAR MECHANICS
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/how-to/a7469/your-car-is-spying-on-you-but-whomis-it-spying-for/.
44 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, LIBERTY AND SECURITY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON LOCATION
TRACKING 3 (2011), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/LocationTrackingReport.pdf; see also Sheppard,
supra note 42 (“Once the suspect’s car is tagged, the GPS module relays the car’s coordinates, heading, and
speed every 3 to 5 seconds to police dispatch.”).
45 See The Problem with Mobile Phones, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/
problem-mobile-phones (last updated Feb. 10, 2015).
40
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situation of any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded
over, in most cases, a practically unlimited period. The potential for a
similar capture of information or “seeing” by law enforcement would
require, at a minimum, millions of additional police officers and
cameras on every street lamp.46

These implications for privacy made it “clear” that “the great popularity of GPS
technology for its many useful applications may not be taken simply as a
massive, undifferentiated concession of personal privacy to agents of the
state.”47 Because the technology enabled law enforcement to “track[] and
record[] relentlessly” the defendant for over two months, the surveillance
violated the state constitution’s “prohibition against unreasonable searches.”48
Several years later, the Supreme Court was confronted with a similar case.
In United States v. Jones, the FBI attached a GPS tracker to a suspected drug
dealer’s car without a valid warrant.49 The device relayed the car’s location with
near-precision for a month, ultimately sending over 2000 pages of data via cell
phone to a government computer.50 The plurality ruled narrowly, holding that
the physical attachment of the tracker to Jones’s property was a trespass, and
was thus an unconstitutional search.51 In two concurring opinions, however, five
members of the Court highlighted the privacy concerns raised by location
tracking, emphasizing the length of the surveillance, the low cost and
surreptitious nature, and the unmatched intrusiveness.52
Only one court so far has addressed whether using a built-in GPS device
without a warrant would constitute a search. In United States v. Williams, a
federal district court in Kentucky ruled that activating an in-car GPS device to
locate a vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, but the court highlighted

46

People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 1200.
48 Id. at 1203.
49 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 404–05.
52 See id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations. . . . [B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain
abusive law enforcement practices . . . .”); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could
not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).
47
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the fact that the device was used only to identify the location at a discrete
moment in time, not to “monitor” the vehicle’s movements.53
2. Cellular Phones
Some 90% of Americans regularly carry a cell phone, using it to make phone
calls, to send texts, and, for the 64% who use a smartphone, to go online, find
directions, play games, and more.54 These cell phones also effectively serve as
personal tracking devices. When turned on, they constantly report their location
to their cellular service provider, and service providers typically store that
location data, at least temporarily.55 The proliferation of cell towers means that
the precision of cell phone targeting is increasing exponentially, perhaps to a
point of even greater precision than GPS data.56 In addition to accessing this
wealth of real-time data, law enforcement may also compel service providers
and other third parties to hand over records of individuals’ locations going back
months.57
Other technologies come into play as well. Smartphones equipped with WiFi and Bluetooth technology continuously send out signals with identifying
information to establish connections; any receiver can determine which phone

53

2015 WL 4484060, at *5–6 (W.D. Ky. July 22, 2015).
Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013) http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/.
55 Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 228 (2011) (statement
of the ACLU), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/senate_hearing_mobile_tracking_may_2011_-_final.pdf
(noting that location data is recorded “approximately every seven seconds”); Cell Phone Location Tracking
Request Response—Cell Phone Company Data Retention Chart, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cell-phonelocation-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (listing
data retention times for different service providers).
56 See Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance (GPS) Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–20 (2012) (statement of Matt
Blaze), http://www.crypto.com/papers/blaze-gps-20120517.pdf; Andy Greenberg, Reminder to Congress:
Cops’ Cellphone Tracking Can Be Even More Precise Than GPS, FORBES (May 17, 2012, 1:57 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/05/17/reminder-to-congress-cops-cellphone-tracking-canbe-even-more-precise-than-gps/#578e3957263c; see also In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Cell phones generate far more location data [than
car GPS systems] because, unlike the vehicle in Jones, cell phones typically accompany the user wherever she
goes.”).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 895 (6th Cir. 2016) (case involving 215 days of cellsite location information); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 441 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Wynn, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (case involving 221 days of cell-site location information); see also
Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The
Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1747–48 (2009).
54
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is where at any given time, and how long it has been there.58 Phones can also
determine their locations via GPS satellites.59 The phone’s location history is
stored on the device until the user clears it and turns off location tracking.60 In
the meantime, third party applications can request access to that location data,61
which can be transmitted without the user’s direct interaction.62
In addition, as of late 2014, nearly fifty state and local police departments in
the United States were known to be using a device popularly called a Stingray
to directly intercept all cell phone signals in a given area.63 Stingrays pretend to
be cell towers, forcing all cell phones in their vicinity to connect through them
and reveal at least their approximate location, even without making a call.64
Notably, they work only when the cell phone is not in use—that is, precisely
when the average user would have no reason to believe his location could be
revealed.65 Newer technology also allows law enforcement to locate cell phones
by “passively” receiving the radio waves the phones emit when they connect
through a cell tower.66
Not only are phones pervasive, but unlike cars, they go nearly everywhere.67
As one court observed, they are the “easiest means to gather the most
comprehensive data about a person’s public—and private—movements

58

The Problem with Mobile Phones, supra note 45.
Id.; see also Stephanie Lockwood, Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding
the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004).
60 See Lisa Eadicicco, Use This Trick to See a Map of Everywhere Your iPhone Knows You’ve Been, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-see-location-history-iphone-2015-4.
61 The Problem with Mobile Phones, supra note 45.
62 See In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1014
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Additionally, most modern smartphones have applications that continually run in the
background, sending and receiving data without a user having to interact with the cell phone.”).
63 Kate Klonick, Stingrays: Not Just for Feds!, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_law_enforcement_uses_an_inva
sive_surveillance.single.html; see also John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY
(Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-police/390
2809/.
64 Klonick, supra note 63.
65 See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 352 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
66 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Police Snap Up Cheap Cellphone Trackers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2015,
12:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-snap-up-cheap-cellphone-trackers-1439933271.
67 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart
phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even
use their phones in the shower.”).
59
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available.”68 It is thus no surprise that a majority of lower courts have held that
acquiring real-time location information via cell phone tracking, particularly for
more than a few days, requires probable cause and a search warrant.69 At least
68

United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2013); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490
(observing cell phone records “can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
around town but also within a particular building”).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-90-01, 2015 WL 5918741, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9,
2015) (noting, without discussion, that a warrant had been requested and granted to initiate real-time cellular
phone tracking); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use of a Pen Register
& Trap & Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, & (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp.
2d 816, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“[D]etailed location information, such as triangulation and GPS data, . . .
unquestionably implicate Fourth Amendment privacy rights.”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for
Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11747, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site
Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949–50 (E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [Sealed], 402 F. Supp. 2d 597,
605 (D. Md. 2005); In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Authorizing Disclosure of Cell Site Info., Nos. 05-403,
05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); cf. In
re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace
Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based
Servs., No. 07-128, 2007 WL 3342243, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2007) (holding that no showing of probable
cause is required “when the Government seeks real-time cell site data” but to obtain real-time “‘Enhanced 911’
services” the government must show probable cause because there is no question it is being used to establish the
exact location of a person or device). Surveys have also reflected this sentiment, with cell phone users expressing
concerns about tracking and attempting to take precautions to block such monitoring. See, e.g., In re Application
for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1024 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2015)
(describing surveys); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014), reh’g denied (Dec. 8, 2014) (“[A]
subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell phone—even on public roads—is an
expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable . . . .” (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))). However, a few courts have allowed the
government to obtain cell phone location information in real-time or prospectively without a warrant by
combining multiple statutory justifications. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing
the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info.
and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for
Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). And
some have held that there is simply no expectation of privacy in cell location information. See, e.g., United States
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013) (holding that when a device
has built-in location-tracking function, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in location data emitted by
device, but also emphasizing that surveillance here lasted only three days); In re Application of the U.S. for an
Order for Authorization to Obtain Location Data Concerning an AT&T Cellular Tel., 102 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889–
90 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (holding that suspects did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in location data
transmitted from cell phones); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 147
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that users are well aware of the geolocation functions of their smartphones and have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the prospective location information they emit); Devega v. State, 689
S.E.2d 293, 300 (Ga. 2010) (holding, prior to Jones, that defendant had no expectation of privacy while on a
public roadway, and use of “ping” information from his cell phone provider to locate his car and arrest him was
merely a more sophisticated form of tracking approved in Knotts).
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two courts have extended this reasoning to Stingrays, holding that they also
require a warrant because of the significant privacy intrusion they enable and
because they allow the police to locate people whom they would not have been
able to find otherwise.70 As one federal judge put it, “[a]bsent a search warrant,
the [g]overnment may not turn a citizen’s cellphone into a tracking device.”71
Historical cell site location information (CSLI)72—that is, records of
individuals’ locations held by cell phone providers—has largely not garnered
the same constitutional protection. In the main, courts view this data as governed
by the third party records doctrine, which holds that there is no expectation of
privacy in information that has been voluntarily shared with a third party—here,
the cell phone provider.73 This doctrine is losing force in the context of digital
data, but it has not yet been authoritatively narrowed or overturned.74
3. Video Cameras
Video is a relatively old form of public surveillance, but it is continually
being enhanced as the technology develops. Surveillance cameras can be
outfitted or integrated with an array of additional technologies,75 including

70

State v. Andrews,134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
United States v. Lambis, No. 15CR734, 2016 WL 3870940, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016).
72 See, e.g., In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1013–14 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing the process of gathering historical CSLI and the substance of the CSLI).
73 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
For cases holding that CSLI is not protected by the Fourth Amendment for this reason, see United States v. Lang,
78 F. Supp. 3d 830, 835–36 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (collecting cases). But see United States v. Cooper, No. 13-cr00693-SI-1, 2015 WL 881578, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (holding that the government must get a warrant
before obtaining sixty days’ worth of historical CSLI).
74 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary
to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”); Michael W. Price,
Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 247 (2016).
75 See Diane Cardwell, At Newark Airport, the Lights Are On, and They’re Watching You, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/business/at-newark-airport-the-lights-are-on-and-theyrewatching-you.html (describing the types of surveillance and data-collection technologies being integrated with
LED light fixtures at Newark Airport).
71
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gunshot detection systems,76 license plate readers,77 thermal imaging,78 and
advanced analytic software that purports to be able to recognize suspicious
activity or crimes in process.79 Facial recognition technology is becoming
increasingly sophisticated as well, and police departments are beginning to
augment surveillance cameras with real-time facial scanning.80 Video cameras
are also being trained to hand off to each other, following an individual’s trail
from one camera to the next, even if he or she disappears in between.81 Other
systems are “joined up,” meaning that camera views can be shared and human
operators can follow individuals from camera to camera.82
Building on that technology, comprehensive “Domain Awareness”
surveillance systems are gaining footholds in American cities, giving police the
ability to track the movements of individual persons and vehicles from afar.83
Even cities without such comprehensive surveillance may nevertheless have
access to hundreds or thousands of surveillance cameras, in both public and
private networks.84 Some jurisdictions monitor their video feeds in real time,
76

See NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., USING PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR CRIME
CONTROL AND PREVENTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THEIR MUNICIPAL PARTNERS
3–4, 25–27 (2011), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412402-Using-Public-Surveillance-Systems-forCrime-Control-and-Prevention-A-Practical-Guide.pdf.
77 Id. at 27–28.
78 See Kim Zetter, Boston Bombing Investigation Exposed Successes, Failures of Surveillance Tech,
WIRED (May 29, 2013, 3:51 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/boston-marathon-investigation/.
79 See LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 76, at 29–30.
80 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-748, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL PROPERTY IN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 35–36 (2003) (noting that CCTV systems in Tampa, Florida, and Virginia Beach, Virginia,
were equipped with facial recognition software); CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHON FRANKLE,
GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINEUP 2, 22–23 (2016),
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/. But see Zetter, supra note 78 (noting that facial-recognition system failed to
identify Boston Marathon bombing suspects because surveillance cameras did not take full-frontal images).
81 Lee Dye, Surveillance Systems Are Getting Smarter, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2014, 6:20 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/surveillance-systems-smarter/story?id=27242336&singlePage=true.
82 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 35–36.
83 Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-cities.html (discussing
surveillance systems used in Oakland); Zetter, supra note 78 (discussing surveillance systems used in New York
City); see also Heather Kelly, After Boston: The Pros and Cons of Surveillance Cameras, CNN (Apr. 26, 2013,
7:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/26/tech/innovation/security-cameras-boston-bombings/ (observing that
the NYPD “can track cars and people moving through 1.7 square miles in lower Manhattan”); Craig Timberg,
New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for Several Hours at a Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 5,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/new-surveillance-technology-can-track-everyonein-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-time/2014/02/05/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html.
84 A Closer Look at Surveillance Cameras Post-Boston, CBSNEWS (May 2, 2013, 11:13 AM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/a-closer-look-at-surveillance-cameras-post-boston/ (noting that the Los Angeles
Police Department has “about 700” cameras); Terry Atlas & Greg Stohr, Surveillance Cameras Sought by Cities

LEVINSON-WALDMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

2/22/2017 1:18 PM

541

while others save the recordings for later viewing as needed, and many models
provide both capabilities.85
Evidence that surveillance cameras deter crime is mixed at best.86 Some
studies have found that cameras contribute to a reduction in property crime,
particularly vehicle thefts, but their impact is difficult to assess reliably since
they are often coupled with other crime prevention efforts.87 Because
surveillance in public areas typically has been deemed not to be a Fourth
Amendment search in the first place,88 however, law enforcement has generally
not been required to justify the use of surveillance cameras. Instead, the judiciary
has historically permitted police to watch public areas or “open fields” without
a warrant.89
After Boston Bombs, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-04-29/
surveillance-cameras-sought-by-cities-after-boston-bombs.html (“Chicago authorities have access to about
10,000 public and private video surveillance cameras . . . .”); L. Gordon Crovitz, In Praise of Surveillance
Cameras, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873
23309604578434712417328162 (“The most recent estimate, from 2010, is that Boston and surrounding towns
have some 150 police surveillance cameras, plus 400 in the subway.”); LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST.,
EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION 23 (2011)
(noting that Baltimore’s “public surveillance program” contains more than 500 cameras); Sam Ford, D.C. Police
Gain Access to Private Surveillance Cameras, WJLA (Oct. 31, 2014), http://wjla.com/news/crime/d-c-policegain-access-to-private-surveillance-cameras-108628 (discussing the partnership between the D.C. Police
department and a private security company, resulting in an additional 300 cameras for the police department).
85 See, e.g., NOAM BIALE, ACLU, EXPERT FINDINGS ON SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS 5 (2008),
https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file708_35775.pdf; JERRY RATCLIFFE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF PUBLIC PLACES 4 (2006), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/pop/e02061006.pdf.
86 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 21 (“[D]emonstrating a direct cause and
effect relationship between decreased crime and CCTV may not be easy to do.”); Sarah J. McLean, Robert E.
Worden & MoonSun Kim, Here’s Looking at You: An Evaluation of Public CCTV Cameras and Their Effects
on Crime and Disorder, 38 CRIM. JUST. REV. 303, 323–24 (2013) (discussing some measurable impacts of
surveillance cameras in Schenectady, New York); Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Public Area CCTV
and Crime Prevention: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 26 JUST. Q. 716, 736 (2009)
(reporting research that demonstrates the effectiveness of surveillance cameras at reducing vehicle crimes in car
parks); LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 84, at 39–41, 79–82 (discussing that surveillance cameras contributed to
crime prevention in some areas of Baltimore and Chicago, but did not reduce crime in Washington, D.C.).
87 BIALE supra note 85, at 3–5 (finding, in preliminary studies, that surveillance cameras contributed, at
most, to some reduction in property crime in several California cities); Welsh & Farrington, supra note 86, at
736 (finding that surveillance cameras were most effective in reducing crime in car parks and vehicle crime and
had little to no effect on other types of crime or crimes in broader public areas, and that some success was likely
a result of other factors as well, such as improved lighting and security guards); RATCLIFFE, supra note 85, at 19
(concluding that “CCTV is more effective at combating property offenses than violence or public order crime”
and “CCTV appears to work best in small, well-defined areas (such as public car parks)”).
88 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not “preclude
an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities
clearly visible”).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a pole camera
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it “was not placed within or even near the curtilage of
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The landscape may be beginning to change. One court recently held that
surreptitiously mounting a surveillance camera on a public utility pole and using
it to monitor a private yard for six weeks was “so different in its intrusiveness
that it [did] not qualify as a plain-view observation.”90 Even using a video
camera to monitor a public business was found to have violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of the store employee who was the subject of its most
sustained surveillance, where the observation was “prolonged” and occurred
from a “non-public vantage point” (because it was surreptitiously mounted out
of sight).91 Nevertheless, there is little consensus so far.92
4. Drones
Drones are unmanned flying crafts that can be as small as an insect or as
large as a 757 passenger jet.93 Much like surveillance cameras, they can be
outfitted with a host of technologies, including high-powered cameras, thermal
imaging devices, license plate readers, laser radar, eavesdropping devices, seethrough imaging, scent detection, signals interception, and direction finding
capabilities; facial or other biometric recognition devices are likely not far
behind.94 Drones are lighter than airplanes, generally cheaper, and require less
fuel and no pilot.
[defendant’s] home” and only captured activity in “open fields”); Rodriguez v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 20,
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (approving of covert video surveillance of activities on public street); State v. Augafa, 992
P.2d 723, 734 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding warrantless video surveillance of defendant on public sidewalk
using camera on a pole nearby); McCray v. State, 581 A.2d 45, 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (permitting covert
video of defendant crossing the street). But see State v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866, 870 (Vt. 1998) (objecting to the
notion of “indiscriminately” aiming video surveillance “at public places [to] capture[] lawful activities of many
citizens in the hope that it will deter crime or capture what crime might occur”).
90 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, at 20
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014).
91 State v. Thomas, 642 N.E.2d 240, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that using a
pole camera to record activities in defendant’s backyard for two months was a Fourth Amendment search, and
observing that “indiscriminate video surveillance raises the specter of the Orwellian state”); Shafer v. City of
Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 942 (D. Nev. 2012) (holding that covert, long-term videotaping of private citizen’s
backyard violates the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 288–90 (6th Cir.
2016), reh’g en banc denied (2016) (holding that surreptitious installation of pole camera and warrantless
surveillance of defendant’s trailer and private property for ten weeks did not violate Fourth Amendment).
93 RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 2 (2013), http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf.
94 Id. at 3–4; JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, ACLU, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 5–6 (2011) [hereinafter
PROTECTING PRIVACY], https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf; Timothy
T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 87–90 (2012); Declan McCullagh, DHS
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The Department of Justice (primarily the FBI), the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Department of Defense have begun using drones in at least a
limited capacity.95 The Customs and Border Protection arm of the Department
of Homeland Security also has the authority to use drones in support of various
federal, state, and local law enforcement activities, though flights are currently
required to take place at heights that would largely preclude the collection of
license plate data or facial pictures.96 In addition, some local police departments
have won permission to test and operate drones, though others have had their
proposals squelched after public outcry.97
The Supreme Court historically has been unconcerned about surveillance by
airplanes; those have been in the context of a one-time flyover, however,
conducted at heights above the standard altitude at which drones are permitted

Built Domestic Surveillance Tech into Predator Drones, CNET (Mar. 2, 2013, 11:30 AM), https://www.cnet.
com/news/dhs-built-domestic-surveillance-tech-into-predator-drones/; Patrick Tucker, The Marines Want MiniMissiles That Hunt for Specific Radio Signals, DEF. ONE (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/
technology/2016/10/marines-want-mini-missiles-hunt-specific-radio-signals/132717/.
95 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: MEASURING
PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 8–9 (2012); THOMPSON, supra note 93, at 3; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
INTERIM REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
(2013) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2013/a1337.pdf; PROTECTING
PRIVACY, supra note 94, at 6–8; Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Dir., Office of Cong. Affairs, FBI, to
Sen. Rand Paul 1 (July 29, 2013), http://www.paul.senate.gov/files/documents/072913FBIResponse.pdf.
96 See, e.g., Letter from Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office to Senator Mary Landrieu et al., 6, 30 (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=758102; Brittany M. Hughes, GAO: DHS Flew Drones for 1,726 Hours Over Interior of U.S., CNS
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/brittany-m-hughes/gao-dhs-flew-drones-1726hours-over-interior-us; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-15-17, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROGRAM DOES NOT ACHIEVE
INTENDED RESULTS OR RECOGNIZE ALL COSTS OF OPERATIONS (2014), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf.
97 See, e.g., Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013,
8:52 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-grounds-police-drone-program/; Cyrus Farivar,
County Sheriff Finally Gets the Drone He Wanted, Ignores Privacy Concerns, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 3, 2014,
7:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/12/county-sheriff-finally-gets-the-drone-he-wanted-ignoresprivacy-concerns/; Susan Greene, Colorado’s Mesa County a National Leader in Domestic Drone Use, COLO.
INDEP. (June 6, 2013), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/127870/colorados-mesa-county-a-national-leaderin-domestic-drone-use; Jennifer Lynch, Miami-Dade PD Releases Information About Its Drone Program; Will
the FAA Follow Suit?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/miamidade-pd-releases-information-about-its-drone-program-will-faa-follow-suit; James Pinkerton, Use of Drones in
Community Policing ‘Uncharted Territory’, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Oct. 26, 2012, 8:37 AM),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Use-of-drones-in-community-policing-unchartered3981675.php; PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 94, at 7–8.
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to operate and thus likely to pick out less detail.98 While no court has yet had an
opportunity to squarely consider law enforcement’s use of drones, at least one
court has noted that the airplane flyover cases “[might] have been decided
differently if law enforcement’s observations included more than a one-time
naked-eye observation” of the area being monitored.99 The court added, albeit
in dicta, that “a drone’s ability to constantly and covertly view and record an
individual or setting infringes on the American public’s reasonable expectation
of privacy that they will not be constantly and covertly observed by the
government without a warrant.”100
5. License Plate Readers
License plate readers are also in increasingly wide use. Readers, which
automatically capture the license plate numbers of passing cars, may be mounted
on stationary poles, moving police cruisers, or handheld devices.101 They can
log the time and date, the vehicle’s GPS coordinates, and pictures of the car; the
newest technology also snaps pictures of the number of occupants inside.102
Readers send the data to a software tool that compares all plates that pass by
against a designated “hot list” (for instance, plates that are known to be stolen,
or AMBER alerts).103 Some also retain plate information for future use.
In addition to use by local and state law enforcement, the Department of
Homeland Security and the Drug Enforcement Administration automatically log
license plates at the border and in “hub cities and high-traffic corridors.”104 One
98 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447–50 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 214–15 (1986);
see also FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334, 126 Stat. 11, 76–77 (2012)
(setting 400-foot limit for drone use); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
99 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, at 19
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014).
100 Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS at 22; see also State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1172 (N.M. 2015) (holding
that “prolonged hovering [by a helicopter] close enough to the ground to cause interference with [the
defendant’s] property” was an unconstitutional violation of the subject’s expectation of privacy).
101 ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO RECORD
AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/feature/you-are-being-tracked.
102 See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, New Traffic-Enforcement Tech Peers into Your Car and Counts
Passengers, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/04/28/automated_
vehicle_occupancy_detection_looks_in_cars_counts_passengers_records.html; Dustin Slaughter, Philly Police
Admit They Disguised a Spy Truck as a Goggle Streetview Car, MOTHERBOARD (May 12, 2016, 4:50 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/philly-police-admit-they-disguised-a-spy-truck-as-a-google-streetview-car.
103 See, e.g., New York v. Davila, 901 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (describing use of hot list);
ACLU, supra note 101, at 5; INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE
UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 2, 24–26 (2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20131024095529/
http://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=N%2BE2wvY%2F1QU%3D&tabid=87.
104 ACLU, supra note 101, at 27 & n.82.
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arm of DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is also seeking to tap in to
commercial license plate databases.105 The data that is collected can be put in
centralized databases and used to plot either the various locations of a particular
vehicle or all of the vehicles at given locations.106
Reliable estimates suggest that there are tens of thousands of readers in
operation across the United States,107 some of which may be able to scan close
to 2000 license plates per minute.108 In some of America’s biggest cities, the
density and capacity of license plate readers allow for millions of license plate
scans,109 a vanishingly small number of which are actually connected to any
crime or wrongdoing.110 Some jurisdictions delete unneeded data immediately,
while others keep the records for up to five years or even indefinitely.111
EZ-Pass readers are another mechanism to automatically log cars’ travel.
While they are typically used to speed a traveler’s route through highway toll
booths, their signal can be read by any transponder set up to register them.112

105 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/ICE/PIA-039, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
ACQUISITION AND USE OF LICENSE PLATE READER DATA FROM A COMMERCIAL SERVICE (2015), https://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-lpr-march2015.pdf; see also Julian Hattem, Feds Scale
Back Proposal for License Plate Tracking System, THE HILL (May 4, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://thehill.
com/policy/technology/240980-feds-scale-back-plan-for-license-plate-tracking-system (noting that the DHS
plan was updated to start with only half the country, instead of whole country).
106 ACLU, supra note 101, at 5–6.
107 See id. at 7; Cyrus Farivar, Your Car, Tracked: The Rapid Rise of License Plate Readers, ARS TECHNICA
(Sept. 27, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/your-car-tracked-the-rapid-rise-oflicense-plate-readers/.
108 Jennifer Lynch & Peter Bibring, Automated License Plate Readers Threaten Our Privacy, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (May 6, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/alpr.
109 See, e.g., Martin Austermuhle, License to Track? D.C. Cameras Capturing Millions of License Plate
Numbers, WAMU 88.5 (Dec. 10, 2013), http://wamu.org/news/13/12/10/license_to_track_dc_police_cameras_
capturing_millions_of_license_plate_numbers.
110 See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 101, at 13–15; Austermuhle, supra note 109.
111 See, e.g., BOS. POLICE, SPECIAL ORDER ON LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION SYSTEM (2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ALPR/massachusetts/4790-4793%20Boston_Special%20Order%2011_
026.pdf (requiring deletion of data after ninety days); L.A. CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE
ON AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION (ALPR) SYSTEM 4886 (2009), http://www.aclu.org/files/
FilesPDFs/ALPR/missouri/alprpra_professionaldevelopmentandresearchbureau_kansascitymo_1.pdf
(requiring deletion only after two years); OHIO EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FY 2010 REGIONAL PROGRAM
GUIDANCE AND APPLICATION PACKAGE 14851 (2010), http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ALPR/ohio/1474914851%20Department%20of%20Public%20Safety.pdf (requiring immediate deletion); MESQUITE POLICE
DEP’T, ACLU OPEN RECORDS REQUEST FOR MPD ALPR RECORDS, 10465–66, http://www.aclu.org/files/
FilesPDFs/ALPR/texas/alprpra_mesquitepd_mesquitetx%20(2).pdf (indefinite retention).
112 Mariko Hirose, Newly Obtained Records Reveal Extensive Monitoring of E-ZPass Tags Throughout
New York, ACLU (Apr. 24, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/newly-obtained-recordsreveal-extensive-monitoring-e-zpass-tags-throughout-new-york.
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New York City has installed machines at intersections throughout the city to
scan all EZ-Pass readers, ostensibly to facilitate traffic management.113
These technologies have not encountered constitutional impediments: the
Supreme Court has emphasized on multiple occasions that because of “the
pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways,”
there is no expectation of privacy in the content of license plates.114 In keeping
with this doctrine, courts have regularly held that law enforcement officers may,
at their discretion and without any reasonable suspicion, do at least an initial
check of a license plate against a law enforcement database.115
This right is not absolute. Where an officer uses the database to acquire
information that a person “reasonably expect[s] would be unavailable to the
police” or whether the acquisition violates police guidelines, constitutional
protections may come into play.116 Law enforcement authority is also cabined
by Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on engaging in a discriminatory pattern
of stops.117 Moreover, there are arguably heightened Fourth Amendment
consequences when it comes to a network of license plate readers that keep
records of cars’ locations over time, information not readily available to the
public. Unlike individual plate checks, the creation of a database of
presumptively innocent people’s movements is not closely tied to the regulatory
purposes cited by the Supreme Court. The cases have not yet, however, grappled
with this distinction.

113

Id.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986)
(“[A]utomobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasive regulation by the State. Every operator of a motor vehicle
must expect that the State, in enforcing its regulations, will intrude to some extent upon that operator’s
privacy . . . .”).
115 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ellison,
462 F.3d 557, 563 (6th Cir. 2006); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1285
(10th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Town of Woodworth, 132 So. 3d 422, 425 (La. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Davila, 901
N.Y.S.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); State v. Davis, 239 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); State v.
Myrick, 659 A.2d 976, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
116 Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d at 1152; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (“An
individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply
because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation.”); State v. Donis, 723 A.2d 35, 40 (N.J.
1998) (holding that law enforcement may not “random[ly] use” license plate databases “to secure ‘the personal
information’ of motorists by police officers who had no reason to suspect wrongdoing”).
117 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 635, 648 (7th Cir. 2001).
114

LEVINSON-WALDMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

2/22/2017 1:18 PM

547

6. Body-Worn Cameras
Police-worn body cameras are increasingly in vogue as well, particularly in
the wake of high-profile shootings of civilians by law enforcement officers;118
civil rights and civil liberties groups have advocated, albeit cautiously, for their
use as a tool of police accountability and transparency.119 The cameras are
typically quite small and can be attached to an officer’s sunglasses, lapel, or
tie.120 Some display a visual signature such as a red light when they are
recording, while others maintain the same appearance whether they are
recording or not.121 Evidence from body cameras has led to the indictment of
police officers for murder on at least two separate occasions.122
Courts have not yet tackled constitutional challenges to body cameras.
Where body cameras only record discrete police-civilian interactions in public
and are not used to track individuals over a longer period, a Fourth Amendment
challenge would seem highly unlikely to be successful.123 As with the other
technologies, however, body cameras can be juiced up. A network of linked
body cameras, for instance, programmed to run continuously, would offer a
fairly comprehensive picture of day-to-day life on the street. If those cameras
were equipped with facial or other biometric recognition technologies, any
person captured in the background of an officer’s daily travels could be tracked,
particularly if the videos were paired with surveillance camera recordings. And
a body camera deployed inside a home will capture information in a
constitutionally protected area, raising additional Fourth Amendment concerns.

118 See, e.g., Nicholas Quah & Laura E. Davis, Here’s a Timeline of Unarmed Black People Killed by Police
over Past Year, BUZZFEED (May 1, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/nicholasquah/heres-a-timelineof-unarmed-black-men-killed-by-police-over#.alX4KM33O.
119 See, e.g., Sens. Schatz, Paul & Reps. Brown, Ellison, Cummings Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to
Help Expand Responsible Use of Police Body Cameras, U.S. SENATOR FOR HAW. BRIAN SCHATZ (Mar. 26,
2015), http://www.schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/sens-schatz-paul-and-reps-brown-ellison-cummings-introducebipartisan-legislation-to-help-expand-responsible-use-of-police-body-cameras.
120 See Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & Danah Boyd, Police Body-Worn Cameras 5 (Data & Soc’y
Research Inst., Working Paper, 2015), http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.
pdf.
121 Id. at 13.
122 Dana Ford, University Cop Indicted for Murder in Shooting of Motorist Samuel DuBose, CNN (July 30,
2015, 12:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/29/us/ohio-sam-dubose-tensing-indictment/; Haley Rush &
Gabrielle Burkhart, Officers to Stand Trial for Killing James Boyd, KRQE NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015, 7:42 AM),
http://krqe.com/2015/08/18/closing-arguments-set-in-albuquerque-police-shooting-case/.
123 Cf. United States v. Stile, No. 1:11-cr-00185-JAW, 2013 WL 6198179, at *3 (D. Me. Nov. 27, 2013)
(rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of dashboard cameras on the grounds that they simply capture a
law enforcement interaction occurring in public).
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7. Biometric Identification Technologies
Finally, most of the technologies described above can be enhanced with
biometric recognition capabilities, which enable individual identification at a
level far faster than manually poring through books of mug shots or databases
of facial pictures. Biometric data can be collected via software that recognizes
faces or other biometric indicators.124 Existing databases already contain
photographs, fingerprints, palm prints, iris scans, voiceprints, and DNA profiles,
along with more basic information such as height, weight, eye and hair color,
and identifying marks, scars, and tattoos.125 Although successful facial
recognition at present largely depends on a controlled environment, the
technology is advancing rapidly.126 Remarkably, fingerprints have been
successfully recreated from photographs of people gesturing normally, and
technology is being developed that scans and identifies a person’s irises from up
to thirty-six feet away, suggesting that a range of biometric data may soon be
available without the subject’s awareness.127
Courts have historically been relatively tolerant of law enforcement
collection of biometric information—pictures, fingerprints, even blood samples,
and more—and have rejected Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to these
practices.128 Nevertheless, while an in-depth analysis of the constitutionality of
124 Next Generation Identification (NGI), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-otherbiometrics/ngi (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
125 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-267, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD
BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf (indicating that
as of 2015, sixteen states allow the FBI to search their photo databases—most including drivers’ license photos
and some including criminal mug shots—for facial recognition purposes, and that the FBI is currently pursuing
contracts with eighteen other states to expand the repository of its Facial Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation
(FACE) Services Unit); Anthony Cuthbertson, FBI Develops Tattoo Tracking Technology, NEWSWEEK (June 3,
2016, 7:45 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/privacy-fbi-tattoo-surveillance-eff-466064; Jennifer Lynch, New
Report: FBI Can Access Hundreds of Millions of Face Recognition Photos, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 15,
2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/fbi-can-search-400-million-face-recognition-photos;
Next
Generation Identification (NGI), supra note 124; see also The Pros and Cons of Gathering Biometric Data, NPR
(Sept. 18, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/18/161355293/the-pros-and-cons-of-gatheringbiometric-data (indicating that fingerprints are being collected as a result of minor traffic offenses).
126 See Derrick Harris, Google: Our New System for Recognizing Faces Is the Best One Yet, FORTUNE (Mar.
17, 2015, 5:05 PM), fortune.com/2015/03/17/google-facenet-artificial-intelligence/.
127 David Goldman, Hackers Recreate Fingerprints Using Public Photos, CNN MONEY (Dec. 30, 2014,
9:07 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/security/fingerprint-hack/index.html; Robinson
Meyer, Long-Range Iris Scanning Is Here, THE ATLANTIC (May 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2015/05/long-range-iris-scanning-is-here/393065/.
128 Refer to the following Fourth Amendment cases: Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (DNA
samples); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606, 634 (1989) (blood testing); Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (fingernail scrapings); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (voice
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these technologies and their intersection with public space surveillance is
beyond the scope of this Article, biometric identification technologies raise
unique issues, particularly since biometric data may be captured remotely from
people not suspected of any wrongdoing and compared against extensive law
enforcement databases and private troves of information.129 In addition, unlike
the other technologies canvassed here, biometric technologies enable a level of
individualized identification that is unmatched. While a car or a phone may be
presumptively associated with its owner, biometric identification technology
tells us conclusively who is actually behind the wheel or holding the device.130
This instant identification hastens a loss of the functional anonymity that
effectively offers some privacy in public. When anyone can be identified from
afar, at the push of a button, it will spell the end of the “practical obscurity,”131
described in more detail below, that many people take for granted when they
move about in public.

exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (fingerprints); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (blood samples). Refer
to the following Fifth Amendment cases: United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) (observing that
criminal suspect “may be compelled . . . to provide a blood sample or handwriting exemplar” (footnotes
omitted)); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2008) (DNA sample); United States v. Reynard, 473
F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (blood samples and DNA profiles); United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290,
1299 (4th Cir. 1995) (voice sample).
129 See, e.g., Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 10 (upholding compulsion of voice exemplar in large part because the
request came from a grand jury and was therefore accompanied by a variety of judicial oversight mechanisms,
implying that the Fourth Amendment analysis could come out differently if voice or facial information were
instead automatically captured without such controls, such as in the case of facial recognition technology
deployed on a surveillance camera or other device); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Appeal of Mills), 686 F.2d
135, 144–45 (3rd Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance of structural restraints
imposed by grand juries); Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth
Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 447 (2011) (“[B]y stepping in front of a faceidentifying camera, a civilian is matched not only with his state-owned photograph but also any data associated
with his name—residence, welfare status, employment, social security number, tax history, criminal record,
child support compliance, etcetera.”); Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1599 (2012)
(observing that learning an individual’s identity also provides law enforcement with “rapid access to criminal
history or ‘status’ databases (for example, those listing alleged gang affiliations)”). For an in-depth treatment of
the constitutionality of biometric identification technologies, see Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap,
Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407,
543 (2012).
130 See Donohue, supra note 129, at 536–37 (“A GPS chip may reveal where the car goes, but the
verification of personally identifiable information, which is at issue in remote biometric identification, is more
invasive in its direct and personal link to a specific individual.”).
131 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)
(balancing, in a FOIA case, the privacy interest in the “practical obscurity” of criminal rap sheets against the
“public interest in their release”).
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II. A MULTI-FACTOR TEST FOR ANALYSIS OF SURVEILLANCE IN PUBLIC
Despite the wealth and range of new technologies available to law
enforcement, the judiciary has not yet developed a single, coherent framework
to address their Fourth Amendment repercussions. This Part teases out analytical
strands from existing cases to construct a comprehensive approach to the
constitutional ramifications of surveillance in public spaces. It proposes a multifactor analysis that is sufficiently adaptable to apply to varied surveillance
technologies, while offering a heightened level of structural rigor and a set of
unifying themes. In addition, because the factors spring from current case law,
this approach will allow courts to use familiar tools to approach new challenges
with confidence, even before the Supreme Court weighs in on each new
technology.
A. Why Isn’t Katz Alone Sufficient?
A prefatory question: Why not simply retain the Katz test without more?
Why isn’t the time-tested inquiry into an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy sufficient? In fact, courts generally still use the Katz analysis to assess
the constitutional implications of new technologies. This Article does not
recommend fashioning a new approach out of whole cloth; the factors proposed
here are, in essence, a more rigorous method of evaluating the reasonable
expectation of privacy. At the same time, in an era of evolving technologies, the
relative simplicity of Katz has become a liability, failing to incorporate a number
of important constitutional questions. Any new approach, while building on the
framework created by Katz, must account for those deficiencies.
To begin with, the Katz approach presumes, in Justice Alito’s words, that the
“hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy
expectations.”132 On the contrary, technology itself—its ubiquity and its
convenience—can dynamically change those expectations. As people become
more reliant on their devices, the technology may seem less intrusive, making
the apparent privacy risks recede as well.133 A test premised on the reasonable
expectation of privacy must become more objective to account for that shift.

132

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809
F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Public ignorance [about the consequences of various technologies]
cannot long be maintained.”).
133
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Moreover, the Supreme Court currently imposes more restrictions on
technologies that are utilized primarily by law enforcement than those that are
in wide use, an approach that puts constitutional rights on an unstable
foundation. In United States v. Kyllo, for instance, the police used special heatsensing technology to detect the possible presence of a marijuana-growing
operation inside a private home.134 The Court suppressed the introduction of the
evidence on the grounds that using “sense-enhancing technology” to obtain
information about the inside of a home that otherwise would have required a
physical intrusion to acquire “constitutes a search,” at least where the technology
is “not in general public use.”135
As invasive technologies become cheaper, however, it becomes increasingly
likely that they will end up in the hands of both the public and law enforcement;
a thermal imaging add-on, for instance, is now available for smartphones.136 If
the Supreme Court does not require a warrant for the police to use any
technology to which the public has access, law enforcement’s surveillance
powers will inexorably expand, and they will do so based on technological
advancements and the falling cost of technology, not on considered policy or
constitutional analysis.137
In making constitutional rights dependent upon the shifting ground of
personal expectations, the reasonable expectation of privacy test also makes the
Fourth Amendment something of an outlier from other guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. As scholar Marc Blitz has argued:
The First Amendment protects the speech of someone even if he is
ignorant of its protection and is resigned to being silenced; why should
the Fourth Amendment not similarly protect someone’s ability to avoid
being videotaped from moment-to-moment even if he is, perhaps,
mistakenly resigned to living in a world where such surveillance is
permissible?138

134

533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
Id. at 34.
136 Megan Geuss, FLIR One, Round Two: The Thermal Imaging Camera Drops $100, Gets a New Shape,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2015, 8:03 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/08/flir-one-round-two-thethermal-imaging-camera-drops-100-gets-a-new-shape/ (discussing how the public can now buy thermal imaging
technology).
137 Accord Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS,
at 27 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) (“Further, given the continued advancement of technology and reduction of
cost in ‘old technology,’ the ‘in general public use’ doctrine may lose viability . . . .”).
138 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth
Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1435–36 (2004).
135
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It is anomalous, in other words, for our (possibly mistaken) understanding of our
constitutional privacy rights to be dependent upon our knowledge about any
given technology, rather than upon fundamental societal and historical
commitments to privacy.
Katz’s approach can also put the government in an enviable position: when
a technology is first introduced, it is new, it is experimental, it is clumsy, and it
is often rolled out secretly or in a limited trial, raising little communal ire. By
the time the technology is in place and publicly revealed, and society has begun
to grasp its true implications, it is too late; only an out-of-touch Luddite could
be said not to understand, and implicitly consent to, all its potential uses. For the
government, it is heads, we win; tails, you lose.
Finally, the Katz test’s focus on individual privacy does not adequately take
into account the harm that surveillance can do to other core interests protected
by the Constitution, in particular the rights to speak and associate guaranteed by
the First Amendment.139 In the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that one
of the main reasons for adoption of the Fourth Amendment was to provide
citizens with the privacy protection necessary for secure enjoyment of First
Amendment liberties.”140 Justice Sotomayor echoed the risks posed to those
values by surveillance in her concurrence in United States v. Jones:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power
to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse. The net result is that [inexpensive location tracking]—by
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of
intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its
unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.”141

139 Cf. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972) (“When governmental activity collides
with First Amendment rights, the Government has the burden of establishing that its interests are legitimate and
compelling and that the incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights is no greater than is essential to
vindicate its subordinating interests.”).
140 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979).
141 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)); see also United States v. PinedaMoreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“The FBI need no longer deploy
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These threats of abuse are not the product of fevered imaginations. The Virginia
State Police, for example, recorded the license plate numbers of attendees at
political rallies for Barack Obama and Sarah Palin, as well as President Obama’s
inauguration, and kept the data for over three years until ordered by the Attorney
General to purge it.142 Police in Denver, Colorado spied on anti-logging activists
and, in response to a training on non-violence, shared license plate information
with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.143
Cell phone tracking is susceptible to abuse as well. Michigan law
enforcement officers were reported in 2010 to have asked a cellular provider for
information about the cell phones that were gathering in the area of an
anticipated labor union protest,144 and Chicago police are alleged to have used
Stingray technology to track participants in lawful protests.145 One security
expert has charged that cell phones used by Occupy Wall Street protesters were
routinely logged by law enforcement as a way of tracking individuals involved
in the movement.146
Moreover, surveillance technologies are frequently targeted at disfavored or
marginalized populations, jeopardizing both First Amendment rights to freedom
of religion and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against discrimination.
The New York City Police Department (NYPD), for instance, used license plate
readers as part of its widespread surveillance of Muslim communities in the New
York area and is alleged to have used surveillance cameras and a host of other
surveillance techniques as well.147 Similarly, an investigation of license plate
agents to infiltrate groups it considers subversive; it can figure out where the groups hold meetings and ask the
phone company for a list of cell phones near those locations.”).
142 Mark Bowes, Police Recorded License Plates at Obama Inauguration, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
(Aug. 18, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/local/crime/article_32678a59-f9e1-5e468336-d5f4ba076cb7.html.
143 Kristin Atkins, Statement—Kirsten Atkins, Target of Illegal Spying, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
statement-kirsten-atkins-target-illegal-spying (last visited Oct. 27, 2016).
144 Michael Isikoff, FBI Tracks Suspects’ Cell Phones Without a Warrant, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2010, 7:00
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/fbi-tracks-suspects-cell-phones-without-warrant-75099.
145 Chicago Activists Claim Police Used ‘Stingray’ Surveillance During Garner Protests, RT (Dec. 10,
2014, 2:45 AM), http://rt.com/usa/212915-protesters-chicago-police-stingray/.
146 Natasha Lennard, Security Expert: All Occupiers’ Phones Were Logged, SALON (June 6, 2013, 3:00
PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/06/security_expert_all_occupiers_phones_were_logged/.
147 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Defends Tactics over Mosque Spying; Records Reveal New
Details on Muslim Surveillance, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
02/24/nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997.html; see also Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 285–88
(3d Cir. 2015) (listing factual allegations by plaintiffs alleging extensive, targeted surveillance of Muslim
community); DIALA SHAMAS & NERMEEN ARASTU, MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON
AMERICAN MUSLIMS 14 (2013), http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf.
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readers in Oakland, California, found that they were located disproportionately
in African-American and Latino neighborhoods, despite the fact that automobile
crimes and offenses predominantly occurred elsewhere.148
This type of governmental surveillance has a measurable effect on people’s
behavior. For instance, many New York-area Muslim-Americans, rocked by
revelations that the NYPD had been spying on them, reported that they stopped
going to worship services or engaging in political discussions, and even became
more cautious about calling the police to report crimes.149 After Edward
Snowden revealed the extent of the government’s spying on Americans in June
of 2013, one-third of American adults took at least one step to conceal their
information, according to a Pew study.150 Journalists and lawyers, who often
work on particularly sensitive issues, felt the impact of the surveillance
revelations especially keenly; many radically changed their practices, including
using time-consuming encryption, traveling to speak with contacts in person
instead of by phone, and even telling contacts that they could not guarantee
confidentiality.151
For these reasons, the nebulous “reasonable expectation of privacy”
framework that has grown out of Katz is increasingly inadequate for our modern
age. This is not to say that courts should cease their investigation into whether
there is an expectation of privacy that would cut against untrammeled law
enforcement use of various surveillance technologies. Rather, the inquiry should
be premised on relatively objective factors that take into account the full range
of interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment, as set out below.152 To be
sure, a multi-factor test will not be entirely objective; judges can always overlay

148 Jeremy Gillula & Dave Maass, What You Can Learn from Oakland’s Raw ALPR Data, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data.
149 SHAMAS & ARASTU, supra note 147.
150 Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar.
16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-snowden/.
151 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL: HOW LARGE-SCALE US SURVEILLANCE IS
HARMING JOURNALISM, LAW, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4–5, 57 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/usnsa0714_ForUPload_0.pdf.
152 This approach would not replace existing constitutional protections for activities and items inside the
home, which have a long pedigree, beginning with the clear text of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that
any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’ was too much.” (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))). Instead, it would augment that core Fourth Amendment
protection by providing a more rigorous structure for constitutional protection of certain activities outside the
home.
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their own preferences on top of each factor. But using these factors to build their
analysis will prompt courts to grapple with the difficult issues they raise.
B. A Multi-Factor Approach to Public Space Surveillance
In light of the discussion above, this Article proposes six factors to guide the
analysis of law enforcement’s use of surveillance technologies to track people
in public: (1) the length of time an individual is subject to surveillance; (2) the
lowering of structural barriers to pervasive surveillance, as measured by
reduction in cost and other resource allocations; (3) the creation of a recording
that can be exploited to create a comprehensive picture of an individual’s life or
be mined for private, sensitive, or embarrassing moments; (4) the collection or
receipt of information from inside a private home or other private space that
would otherwise require a warrant; (5) erosion of core constitutional rights that
traditionally have been understood to be protected by the Fourth Amendment;
and (6) the combination of multiple surveillance technologies that may not
trigger Fourth Amendment coverage standing alone, but pose significant risks
to Fourth Amendment rights when taken together.
Enumerating these factors creates a framework that adds rigor to the
constitutional inquiry, while retaining the flexibility that is a hallmark of Fourth
Amendment analysis. Because these factors are technology-neutral, they can
stand the test of time, rather than being left behind at the next set of innovations.
Other commentators, most notably David Gray and Danielle Citron, have
advocated for an explicitly technology-dependent approach.153 In their model, a
technology would be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation if it could
“facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable
expectations of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a surveillance state”
if “law enforcement officers or other government agents” were permitted to
deploy and use the technology in their “unfettered discretion.”154 In other words,
if a given technology could be used to facilitate a surveillance state by collecting
a quantity of information that, in toto, intrudes on an individual’s privacy, then
any use of that technology would constitute a search.155

153
154
155

David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 73 (2013).
Id. at 71–72.
See id.
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This is a thought-provoking and in some ways intuitively appealing model;
it echoes the “theory of creepy” put forth by Omar Tene and Jules Polonetsky.156
At the same time, I believe this model fails to grapple adequately with the
practical ramifications arising from declaring that entire technologies trigger
Fourth Amendment coverage, and I thus adopt a different approach.157
156 Omar Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and Shifting Social Norms,
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 60 (2013) (suggesting that “creepy” is increasingly being used as a “term of art” to
“denote situations” in which our “social values” and our “technological capabilities” do not appear to align).
157 In brief, while the technology-dependent proposal aligns with my concerns regarding the ability of
modern-day technologies to enable a surveillance state, it leaves some important questions unanswered (or
insufficiently answered). First, it neglects to account sufficiently for technologies that surely do not constitute a
search on their first use but could be used to aggregate a constitutionally significant amount of data about a
person; license plate readers come immediately to mind. Gray and Citron do acknowledge there will be close
cases, but do not explain how to account for them, and close cases seem particularly difficult in an all-or-nothing
model. See Gray & Citron, supra note 153, at 130 (“We therefore accept the inevitability of close cases. In doing
so, however, we emphasize that the systemic burden of close cases will be much lighter under a technologycentered approach than they would be under a mosaic theory.”).
The piece also seems to presume that a warrant would not always be required for searches, offering a
variety of policy and statutory options. These alternatives may well be more nuanced and practicable than a
warrant, and have much to recommend them. But constitutional doctrine requires that if the police carry out a
search, they must obtain a warrant first (in the absence of a special need or another exception), and the proposal
does not appear to sufficiently address how that process—which is key to the success of any Fourth Amendment
regime, no small matter—would play out. See, e.g., id. at 111 (“Applied to drones, GPS-enabled tracking, and
similar technologies, this [warrant] requirement might mean setting limits on when, how, and how long a device
can be deployed. A court might also require officers to take steps to minimize information about innocent third
parties that is gathered incidentally. As in all Fourth Amendment cases, the guiding principle would be to strike
a reasonable balance between the investigative needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of the suspect
and society at large.”); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (holding that where “a search
is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,” the Fourth
Amendment “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967) (observing that “searches conducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). In
particular, Gray and Citron’s account of negotiated agreements like consent decrees is thought provoking, and
may even prove to be efficient and privacy-protective, but it is not clear where those agreements fit into the
warrant scheme. One is reminded of the Chief Justice’s comment in Riley v. California that “the Founders did
not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.” 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
Even where the proposal implies that a warrant will be necessary, it is left unsaid exactly when it would
come into play. For instance, the piece rightly raises constitutional alarms about New York City’s Domain
Awareness System, described here in Section I.B.3. See Gray & Citron, supra note 153, at 70 (“Granting law
enforcement unfettered access to twenty-first century surveillance technologies like aerial drones, DAS [Domain
Awareness System], and sweeping data collection efforts, implicates these same Fourth Amendment interests.”).
But if a warrant is to be obtained for the technology itself, at what point should that occur? When the first
computer is purchased? When the first two machines are linked up? When license plate readers are added to the
system? It is appealing to say that the technology itself should be covered, but when the technology is really a
system of interconnected technologies, there’s a bit of a boiling frog problem—at what point does the Domain
Awareness System move from being a set of discrete items to the system itself? The authors also seem somewhat
too optimistic about law enforcement’s openness to tight regulations, since police departments have more
frequently demonstrated obfuscation and overreach when it comes to surveillance technologies, as discussed
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The analysis outlined here will necessarily be carried out “in the light of the
values of freedom of expression,” as the Supreme Court has directed.158 In some
circumstances, there may be standalone First Amendment claims either on top
of or in place of Fourth Amendment claims, as described below.159 Surveillance
that targets or disproportionately affects protected groups may also give rise to
Fourteenth Amendment claims, though that analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article.
Courts will conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry in each case to determine which
elements are triggered and how much weight to give to each. Courts already
engage in a similar process to determine whether a particular law enforcement
activity constitutes a search; indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that it has
“consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific
nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”160 This approach would provide
guideposts for that inquiry. Courts do this in other contexts as well, including
assessing fair use in the copyright arena161 and evaluating the adequacy of a
special needs search.162 Thus, as one court concluded in requiring a
particularized warrant for thirty days’ worth of phone tracking, while it may be
difficult in some circumstances to identify the moment at which “the aggregation
of data showing movement in public spaces crosses the line and becomes a
‘search’ . . . [,] courts have confronted similar problems in the past” and
managed to weigh the various interests at hand.163
above. See, e.g., id. at 123 (suggesting that “there is good reason to think that law enforcement agencies will be
receptive” to regulation of surveillance).
These criticisms are not meant to undermine the overall force of the argument; there are, as this article
acknowledges, challenges to a holistic approach. Gray and Citron do a powerful job of setting out an approach
that would provide certainty for law enforcement with respect to each technology, once there is an initial
determination regarding whether the technology would facilitate a surveillance state. These critiques are simply
meant to clarify why this article chooses a different route.
158 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973); see also New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868,
873 (1986) (indicating that First Amendment-protected materials are entitled to heightened procedural
protections against searches and seizures); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property at 104 East Tenth Street,
Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (“The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of
knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of
expression.”); ABA STANDARDS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL
SURVEILLANCE standard 2-9.1 (3d ed. 1999), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_
section_archive/crimjust_standards_taps_blk.html (recommending that courts weigh impact of surveillance on
First Amendment freedoms in assessing new technologies).
159 See Part II.D.
160 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
161 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 554–55 (2008) (reviewing case law and describing four primary factors in a fair use analysis).
162 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (endorsing a balancing framework).
163 United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 623–24 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
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Needless to say, this approach is vulnerable to (at least) one major objection:
sliding scale approaches are in danger of becoming “more slide than scale,” as
Anthony Amsterdam famously observed in his critique of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.164 This critique, as well as the practical need to give police
enough certainty that they can reliably determine in advance whether a warrant
is necessary, has led some scholars to advocate for a legislative approach.
Christopher Slobogin, for instance, has proposed a detailed statutory structure
that would require an escalating set of procedures to authorize governmental
monitoring.165 Orin Kerr has written in favor of statutory regimes as well,
arguing that they are better suited to provide strong privacy protections.166
While the optimal outcome may be to obtain both statutory and judicial
change, a statutory approach alone will not suffice. As a practical matter,
Congress is likely to pass a comprehensive federal privacy and surveillance
statute at approximately the same time D.C. becomes the fifty-first state with
full voting representation—that is to say, never.167 State legislatures may make
more progress, and one could argue that it is appropriate for the states, as
Brandeisian laboratories of democracy, to implement different privacy regimes
depending upon the needs and political power of their respective citizenry.168

164

Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 (1974).
Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory
Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 4–5 (2012). In
Slobogin’s framework, surveillance of an individual lasting less than twenty minutes could be carried out without
any process. Id. at 25. Surveillance of between twenty minutes and forty-eight hours in aggregate would require
reasonable suspicion and a court order. Id. at 27. And anything over forty-eight hours would require probable
cause and a court order. Id. By contrast, a “general public search”—for instance, setting up CCTV cameras for
general public safety surveillance—would not require a warrant or other court order at all, but would require
that the group being surveilled have had access to a transparent political process that led to the installation of the
camera. Id. at 30–32.
166 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 859–60 (2004) (“When technologies are new and their impact remains
uncertain, statutory rules governing law enforcement powers will tend to be more sophisticated, comprehensive,
forward-thinking, and flexible than rules created by the judicial branch. . . . Because early adopters of new
technologies tend to have disproportionate political influence, legislators often will be unusually sensitive to
privacy threats raised by technological change.”).
167 See, e.g., Matt Fuller, Will This Be the Most Do-Nothing Year of a Staunchly Unproductive Congress?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-accomplishments-donothing_us_5723801ae4b01a5ebde56947 (describing Congress’s internal dysfunction and inability to pass
significant legislation); Rachel Kurzius, GOP Draft Platform Not So Hot On D.C. Statehood, DCIST (Jul. 12,
2016, 11:26 AM), http://dcist.com/2016/07/gop_draft_platform_not_so_hot_on_dc.php (describing the
Republican Party’s opposition to D.C. statehood).
168 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A] single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
165
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But a patchwork quilt of state statutes granting varying degrees of privacy
protection is not adequate when foundational Fourth Amendment rights are at
stake. Such a system would leave a fraction—likely a large fraction—of citizens
deprived of critical constitutional guarantees.
To be sure, state legislatures, city councils, and even police departments
could put in place more stringent protections than the Fourth Amendment
requires, and they could act to implement safeguards before the courts reach
consensus, as the Department of Justice has already done in requiring a warrant
for Stingrays.169 But those may not replace fundamental Fourth Amendment
protections.
More broadly, Kerr has suggested that courts should adopt a bright-line
approach rather than a sliding-scale analysis, invoking Katz as the paradigm:
If courts must broaden Fourth Amendment rules in response to new
technologies, the better approach is to rule that certain steps are always
searches. The model should be the Supreme Court’s famous decision
in Katz v. United States, not the concurring opinions in Jones.
....
. . . Under Katz, bugging and wiretapping that had been beyond
Fourth Amendment protection were brought inside that protection to
account for the new world of telephone communications. Notably, the
Katz Court did not say that short-term bugging was permitted but that
long-term bugging became a search at some unspecified point. Instead,
the Court followed the traditional sequential approach by holding that
all bugging of a phone while it was in a person’s private use triggered
the Fourth Amendment. Application of the same method to the use of
relatively new surveillance techniques such as GPS surveillance
suggests that the Court should choose between two basic options
[adhering to Knotts/Karo or overturning them in full].170

This example proves too much, however. The pay phone wiretap in Katz was a
different animal from modern-day surveillance. In Katz, the phone was either
bugged or it was not; the police were either listening in or they were not.171 The
difficulty with emerging public surveillance technologies is precisely that they
169

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR
TECHNOLOGY (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download (imposing a warrant requirement for
most situations in which the FBI and other DOJ components use a Stingray; the policy does not apply to state or
local law enforcement).
170 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315, 353 (2012).
171 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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do not lend themselves to such a strict demarcation. Few people would argue
that flipping on a surveillance camera in public for a moment constitutes a
search,172 but following an individual for a month with a network of linked
cameras is likely to appear to most people to tread on their Fourth Amendment
rights to privacy. Declaring that every use of surveillance technology in public
is a search is not consistent with effective and practicable policing; at the same
time, declaring that no surveillance technology used in public constitutes a
search is at odds with both evolving expectations of privacy and existing
jurisprudence.
It is also notable that this approach—declaring that certain types of
surveillance are either always a search or never a search—would be likely to
significantly increase the number of situations in which a warrant is required,
including those where it is not possible to get one either because the particularity
requirement could not be satisfied or because the police do not yet have enough
information to demonstrate probable cause. It is not clear what is meant to
happen in those circumstances.
With these cautions in mind, the approach this Article proposes fleshes out
and formalizes a task that courts have already undertaken to some degree;
clarifies and articulates each factor; and offers ex ante guidance and certainty to
law enforcement, the judiciary, and the populace alike. Armed with these
factors, courts and law enforcement can determine more reliably and
consistently where privacy, technology, and pervasive surveillance intersect
with the demands of the Fourth Amendment.
1. Duration
a. Long-Term Surveillance: A Threat to Privacy and the First
Amendment
The first factor is the length of the surveillance: specifically, whether it is of
a duration that is longer than one would expect the police to accomplish without
transformative technology.173 The hallmark of many of the surveillance
technologies described above is that they collect information over a far longer

172

But see Gray & Citron, supra note 153.
Cf. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 895–96 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concurring) (calling
for “a new test to determine when a warrant may be necessary” in cases involving the “long-term, comprehensive
tracking of an individual’s location,” in light of the “quantity of records or the length of time” that may be at
stake).
173
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period of time than would be feasible without the technology,174 and the
information, taken as a whole, reveals far more than any individual point in time.
Standing alone, this is often maligned (for reasons explained below) as the
mosaic theory, but it captures a critical fact that the U.S. Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia has emphasized:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by
short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what
he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information
can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip
viewed in isolation.175

In other words, the whole is truly more than the sum of its parts. This long-term
surveillance works a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy and diminishes
the obscurity that many people take for granted in their day-to-day movements.
Courts have returned to this idea again and again in assessing these technologies.
For instance, one district court recently held that thirty days of surveillance
“extend[ed] well beyond what any reasonable person might anticipate,”
implicating the defendant’s “subjective expectation [of privacy] in his
movements over time.”176
174

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom., United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Records that once would
have revealed a few scattered tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire mosaic—a vibrant and
constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”).
176 United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 621–23 (E.D. Mich. 2014); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 430
(Alito, J., concurring) (reasoning that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy”); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 447 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Wynn, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Quantity matters, too. And in my view, the
sheer volume of data the government acquired here decides this case.”); United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597,
602 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that individuals have “a legitimate expectation to be free from constant video
surveillance” (emphasis added)); United States v. Cooper, 2015 WL 881578, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015)
(suppressing sixty days’ worth of location data obtained without a warrant on the grounds that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in location data and Congress did not intend the Stored Communications Act
to cover this data); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025EFS, at 25 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) (emphasizing the “prolonged nature of the video surveillance”); In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113,
119 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that 113 days of historical cell phone records, showing the user’s location,
“capture[] enough of the user’s location information for a long enough time period . . . to depict a sufficiently
detailed and intimate picture of his movements”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure
of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535, 539-42 (D. Md. 2011) (finding that
Fourth Amendment requires probable cause warrant to access thirty days’ worth of movement data); David Gray
& Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 415 (2013) (“The tapestries of our lives are by definition an
aggregation of events and activities that, when assessed discretely, or even iteratively, may have little
175
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This is not a new approach: some thirty years ago, a federal district court
opined in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago that “there should come
a point when, in tenaciously tracking and piecing together the details of a
person’s life from multifarious sources, the resulting probe becomes so intrusive
as to amount to an invasion of privacy even if the individual pieces of the probe
are from public sources.”177 Similarly, the appeals court in Maynard, the
decision below in the Jones GPS tracking case, pinpointed the distinction
between tasking an officer on the street to watch someone’s movements versus
doing the job via digital age surveillance:
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone
during a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from
work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent
again the next day and the day after that, week in and week out,
dogging his prey until he has identified all the places, people,
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private
routine.178

The addition of technology has thereby both raised the stakes and lowered the
barriers to intensive, intrusive surveillance.
The collection of this wealth of information can also impinge on the subject’s
First Amendment rights to freedom of religion, freedom of speech and
association, and more.179 As the Alliance to End Repression court recognized
several decades ago, law enforcement’s maintenance of a “dossier”—the predigital version of the comprehensive sweep of information now available via
surveillance technologies—that was “so extensive as to create an entire portrait
of [the subject’s] personal, family, financial, and political life” was a “violat[ion
of] her first amendment rights.”180
Justice Sotomayor amplified this concern in her concurrence in Jones, noting
that location surveillance can “generate[] a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,

significance. When assessed holistically, however, these events not only tell a detailed story of our activities and
associations, they may reveal who we are at a fundamental level and therefore expose opportunities for
manipulation and control.”).
177 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
178 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560.
179 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
180 Alliance to End Repression, 627 F. Supp. at 1047, 1056 (adding that assembling details about a person’s
life “can only serve to stifle the very sort of lawful, robust dissent that the first amendment, from its inception,
was intended to protect”).
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political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”181 The knowledge
that the government has access to such a broad scope of detailed information can
thus have a chilling effect, making people reluctant to engage in speech,
association, or dissent for fear of having the dragnet turned on them.
b. How Long Is Too Long?
It is easy to object to surveillance that is “very long”—but how long is too
long? The current case law suggests that somewhere between six hours182 and
two weeks183 is the sweet spot; no court has yet set a bright line, and courts may
be unlikely to reach a point of precision.184 At the same time, law enforcement
needs more guidance than “you’ll know it when you see it,” since at that point
it may be too late and the evidence suppressed.185 I propose that the length of
time that would invoke the durational factor is a period that is longer than the
police would be expected to engage in surveillance under ordinary
circumstances, using tools that require some human involvement. While
admittedly not precise, this standard offers a benchmark for measuring a period
of surveillance that would not raise constitutional questions, as against a period
that would require the involvement of a neutral magistrate.
Thus, if an officer equipped with binoculars, a radio, or a car could and would
follow an individual for four, six, or eight hours, that same duration enabled by
181

Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195,
1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“[T]echnology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity . . . a highly detailed
profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations . . . .”).
182 Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d 231 (Mass. 2015); see also United States v. Scott, 2015 WL
4644963, at *6 n.7, *8 n.9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2015) (ruling that ninety minutes of historical cell data was too
brief a window to raise constitutional concerns, while emphasizing that the data did not reveal “precise historical
location” and that there may be a “reasonable expectation of privacy in records . . . that encompass a longer
period of time”).
183 Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d at 234 (ruling that request for two weeks of historical cell site location information
required a warrant, regardless of the amount planned for use at trial); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that location surveillance would trigger the Fourth Amendment “before
the 4-week mark”).
184 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971) (noting “the unstartling proposition that
when a line is drawn there is often not a great deal of difference between the situations closest to it on either
side”); cf. Gray & Citron, supra note 176, at 425 (noting that courts can choose, and have chosen, simply to lay
down a bright line).
185 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is essential
to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”); Gray & Citron, supra note 176, at
409 (“Among the most important burdens of any Fourth Amendment standard is that it must provide clear
guidance to police officers and lower courts. Muddy and unpredictable tests are both unfair and ultimately fail
to provide substantial protection.”).
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one of the technologies covered here would not contribute to a finding of a
search. Where the duration of surveillance is longer than would be practicable
without scene-changing technology, however, it would go on the “search” side
of the column.186
To be clear, when we talk about the duration of monitoring, we are referring
to the monitoring of a specific individual or group, not simply an open area in
which any given person is likely to appear only for a short time. This is so for
the simple reason that Fourth Amendment claims are brought by defendants, and
there must be an identifiable defendant (be it an individual or a group) who is
surveilled for a long enough period that it gives rise to a Fourth Amendment
injury. Where a network of interconnected cameras enables the tracking of a
single individual or group traveling across the area covered by the cameras, the
durational factor will come into play; the network essentially acts as a single tool
of surveillance with capabilities far above any individual camera.
To be sure, the mosaic theory, which is essentially the durational factor by
another name, has been criticized by a range of commentators. Orin Kerr,
perhaps the most prominent challenger, has lodged both practical and doctrinal
objections to the mosaic theory, arguing that it is difficult to administer and that
it is essentially a holistic inquiry, in tension with the traditional, “sequential”
Fourth Amendment approach that requires that a search spring from a single,
discrete police action.187 Yale scholar Priscilla Smith argues that the mosaic
theory is simultaneously too broad—it could, in theory, apply to the aggregated
visual observations of a beat cop over time, which is at odds with any workable
notion of policing—and too narrow—it would not cover single, time-limited
episodes of highly intrusive surveillance, which could impinge on constitutional
rights.188 The Supreme Court of Florida recently took aim as well, describing the
mosaic theory as too problematic to reliably implement.189
Nevertheless, the inquiry into the duration of surveillance captures the
judiciary’s growing discomfort with the accumulation of details about
individuals’ lives; details that are far more revealing in aggregate than anything
186 Of course, there are circumstances in which law enforcement would conduct a month-long stakeout,
even if it required significant personnel and financial resources. Nevertheless, even a physical stakeout is
qualitatively different from long-term electronic surveillance, which observes everything, no matter how
picayune, and records it for later review.
187 Kerr, supra note 170, at 314–15.
188 Priscilla J. Smith, Much Ado About Mosaics: How Original Principles Apply to Evolving Technologies
in United States v. Jones, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 557, 563 (2013).
189 Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 520 (Fla. 2014).
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that could have been gathered by even the most dogged and sleepless police
officer. Moreover, because the durational approach would be one factor among
several, rather than carrying the whole weight of the inquiry as with the mosaic
theory, a given method of surveillance need not rise or fall solely on the
somewhat ineffable question of how long is too long. As the government uses
these technologies with more regularity, and as the courts issue more rulings on
their constitutional implications, law enforcement agencies will be put on notice
that a surveillance technology that could observe an individual or identifiable
group for more than a brief duration stands a substantial chance of being rejected
on constitutional grounds in the absence of a warrant, enabling them to go to a
magistrate judge for approval on the front end.
2. Cost
The second factor for courts to consider is whether the surveillance is so
much less costly, in terms of officer time, dollar costs, or other metrics, that it
substantially reduces or even removes the practical barriers to dragnet
surveillance. One of the defining aspects of digital age technology is that it
allows surveillance that used to be expensive and time-consuming to be carried
out so easily that police often no longer have to weigh the value and
intrusiveness of the surveillance against the resources required to carry it out.190
As Justice Sotomayor put it, because technological surveillance “is cheap in
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”191
Monitoring that would have occupied a team of law enforcement officers
working in shifts, around the clock, has been supplanted by technologies that
require little investment of time and yield a wealth of data.
From a law enforcement perspective, this reduction in cost and manpower is
a feature, not a bug. And to be clear, the increasing availability of cutting-edge
technology to law enforcement is not in itself a constitutional problem; no one
would expect police to continue to operate via teletypes and punch-card
190 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely
undertaken. The surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four
weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Only an
investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources.
Devices like the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”).
191 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426
(2004)).
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machines. But as courts are increasingly recognizing, this diminution in cost
actually has significant constitutional consequences for privacy, by diluting
structural privacy and “enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times
would have been prohibitively expensive.”192 As the Supreme Court of Florida
put it, invoking James Madison:
[T]he ease with which the government, armed with current and everexpanding technology, can now monitor and track our cell phones, and
thus ourselves, with minimal expenditure of funds and manpower, is
just the type of “gradual and silent encroachment” into the very details
of our lives that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent.193

Justice Alito also flagged the relative ease and cheapness of GPS surveillance
when he suggested, in his concurrence in Jones, that longer-term monitoring
would trigger constitutional scrutiny.194 And in ruling that long-term GPS
surveillance was unconstitutional, the appeals court in Maynard emphasized the
near-zero cost of GPS monitoring as against the time and expense of human
surveillance:
Continuous human surveillance for a week would require all the time
and expense of several police officers, while comparable photographic
surveillance would require a net of video cameras so dense and so
widespread as to catch a person’s every movement, plus the manpower
to piece the photographs together. . . . [P]rolonged GPS monitoring is
not similarly constrained. On the contrary, the marginal cost of an
additional day—or week, or month—of GPS monitoring is effectively
zero. . . . For these practical reasons, and not by virtue of its
sophistication or novelty, the advent of GPS technology has
occasioned a heretofore unknown type of intrusion into an ordinarily
and hitherto private enclave.195

192 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Powell, 943 F.
Supp. 2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[T]he government can often detail DEA agents to follow suspects on
highways for a few hours almost as easily as they can track a cell phone. But the same technology and grant of
authority, without more care, can also permit the government to conduct near-limitless around-the-clock
surveillance of a person’s location, subject only to the limitation of where the suspect may not have taken a cell
phone.”).
193 Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 522 (quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957, F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 & n.67 (D.D.C. 2013)).
194 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that “the use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy”).
195 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see
also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“GPS is not a mere enhancement of human sensory
capacity, it facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which the situation of any object may be
followed and exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unlimited period. The potential for a similar
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In other words, while the technology may not have been expressly designed for
mass surveillance, the fact that it costs pennies on the dollar as compared to
previous tracking methods means that law enforcement can monitor an
individual’s movements, or many individuals’ movements, at a scale that simply
would have been impossible in earlier decades. This ease, while surely valuable
to law enforcement, also eliminates the practical barriers to dragnet surveillance
that once existed.
To be clear, the cost to be taken into account is the cost of the surveillance
itself, not the up-front costs associated with purchasing the particular
surveillance device. The cost of the device itself will be amortized over its life,
which will vary depending on the type of device, the frequency of its use, and
the regularity with which new technologies are developed and rolled out.196 In
addition, the cost of investing in a particular technology may drop over time.
Finally, judges already appear to base their cost comparison on the cost of
conducting the surveillance,197 and it is that cost that is most relevant to the
lowered barriers to structural privacy. Once a surveillance technology is
purchased, whether it costs $100 or $1000 or $10,000, it is the price of carrying
out the surveillance that alters and perhaps erases the structural incentive for
police to collect only the information they believe is really necessary.
In conducting this analysis, courts may decide to quantify the precise
difference that triggers Fourth Amendment coverage. For instance, privacy
advocates and experts Kevin Bankston and Ashkan Soltani have proposed that
if a “new tracking technique” is at least ten times “less expensive than the
previous technique, the technique violates expectations of privacy and runs afoul
of the Fourth Amendment.”198 Alternately, courts may employ a more flexible,
case-by-case analysis, taking into account the cautions articulated above.
Either way, as Justice O’Connor said some twenty years ago, “[w]ith the
benefits of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms comes the burden of

capture of information or ‘seeing’ by law enforcement would require, at a minimum, millions of additional police
officers and cameras on every street lamp.”).
196 See also Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making
Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 341 (2014) (“[O]ur calculations do not include
fixed costs, such as the cost of equipment, as they are amortized over time and over a large number of cases.”).
197 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (comparing following
suspects on highway with monitoring a suspect’s location via cell phone); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 (comparing
cost of human surveillance with cost of GPS monitoring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (comparing cost of “traditional surveillance” with long-term GPS monitoring).
198 Bankston & Soltani, supra note 196, at 337.
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corresponding constitutional responsibilities.”199 (Peter Parker’s Uncle Ben put
it even more pithily: “[W]ith great power comes great responsibility.”200) In
other words, as the cost in time and resources of surveillance ratchets down, the
constitutional import ratchets up.
3. Recording
The third factor for courts to consider is whether the surveillance technology
creates a recording for later review. The existence of a recording raises several
concerns, each constitutionally significant in different ways.
First, recording is the chief method for developing a mosaic of a person’s
life. Far more so than watching in real time, creating a recording enables the
extraction of a host of interconnected inferences about an individual’s
associations, proclivities, and more. Indeed, recording will often be the only way
to create a mosaic, since the ability to construct a mosaic depends on the
compilation of enough data points—more than human memory can hold—to
yield the big picture.201 Recording thus enables the construction of
comprehensive picture of a person’s life that otherwise would be out of reach to
all but her closest intimates. This information can also be used as a cudgel to
“stifle . . . lawful, robust dissent.”202
Relatedly, the creation of a recording enables the overlay of other
technologies that pose heightened risks to privacy. Sophisticated data-crunching
algorithms that analyze and extract ever-deeper levels of sensitive information,
for instance, rely on a database of information that is accumulated by recording
or compiling individual events.203 Recording also enables the after-the-fact

199

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Spider-Man Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0145487/quotes (last visited Mar. 18, 2016).
201 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording
and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 56 (2013) (“Recording is also usually indispensable
to creating the kind of detailed ‘mosaic’ of a person’s life, which the D.C. Circuit found so concerning and
identified as a basis for subjecting GPS surveillance to Fourth Amendment limits.”).
202 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
203 See generally Peter Moskowitz, The Future of Policing Is Here, and It’s Terrifying, GQ (Nov. 9, 2015,
2:27 PM), http://www.gq.com/story/the-future-of-policing-is-here-and-its-terrifying (“Cops are using software
programs that use algorithms to analyze surveillance, GPS coordinates, and crime data to pinpoint specific areas
where, and specific people who, might at some point commit a crime.”); Kaveh Waddell, Half of American
Adults Are in Police Facial-Recognition Databases, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/half-of-american-adults-are-in-police-facial-recognitiondatabases/504560/ (noting that facial recognition algorithms can compare surveillance and video with databases
of ID photos or mugshots).
200
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application of biometric identification technologies to pierce, quickly and
seamlessly, the relative anonymity of law-abiding citizens.
Finally, a recording may pick up single, highly sensitive moments in time
that would otherwise be essentially anonymous. Justice Sotomayor highlighted
this concern in her concurrence in Jones, noting that individual trips to “the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center,
the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar,” and more are
“indisputably private” in themselves.204
Notably, the technology to extract individual, sensitive details from a
database of videotape is already here. For instance, one surveillance company
has developed technology that enables quick searches for individuals, vehicles,
and more:
Its software can identify objects by shape, size and color. It can read
license plates and recognize cars. When it comes to people, it can
detect their gender, approximate age, mood and other demographic
information. Using multiple cameras, it can track their patterns and
some behaviors. It automatically zooms in on any person’s face and
identifies them based on things like the distance between their eyes or
the shape of their nose.
All that information is stored in a database. Big clues that would
take a traditional investigator untold hours of watching video to
uncover can be found with a 15-second search query.205

Of course, any police officer (or citizen) who is simply standing on the street
could view these moments-in-time as well—no newfangled device needed. No
court has suggested, nor does this Article propose, that officers should be
204

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Weaver,
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)); see also State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012)
(Eckerstrom, J., dissenting) (“If told that a stranger had been, without our knowledge, electronically tracking our
movements, few of us would deny feeling some invasion had occurred. I also suspect that most Americans would
consider such non consensual tracking to be an intrusion regardless of whether the tracking had (1) occurred for
thirty days or thirty minutes, (2) followed only their movements in hypothetical public view, or (3) coincidentally
disclosed any especially private event in their lives.”), review denied (Jan. 8, 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2803
(2013); Smith, supra note 188, at 580–81 (“The most common examples of the technology’s intrusiveness
involve the possibility that certain information will be obtained—information that is found on just one ‘tile’ in
the mosaic and that can be gathered from just one trip.” Further noting that the concurring justices in Jones “do
not completely jump on the mosaic bandwagon because they share a broader concern that Government spying
could lead to a world in which the government needs only to run a quick search through the database to find
something—just one thing—you wish it had not seen”).
205 Kelly, supra note 83.
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restricted from using basic tools of policing, including: maintaining a presence
in public, watching for potentially suspicious activities (in the course of which
they might witness any number of sensitive or innocuous events), and drawing
on their knowledge of a particular neighborhood or community to make sense
of what they see.
Nevertheless, anyone who steps outside takes the risk that they may be seen,
whether by a police officer or civilian, whether to the grocery store, the abortion
clinic, or the NRA meeting. What they do not expect is that each of those
moments will be recorded and kept in perpetuity for later discovery and analysis
by a probing law enforcement officer, either wholesale or piecemeal. Marc Blitz
has argued the point in detail:
With comprehensive video archives, authorities would . . . be able to
randomly stop and closely scrutinize numerous people on public
streets, doing so this time by pausing on a person’s image, enhancing
or magnifying detail, and electronically matching aspects of each
person’s appearance against biometric or other databases.
....
Such evidence, of course, has always been there for neighbors or
strangers to see (and perhaps to spy on), but modern video surveillance
now makes it possible (and potentially quite simple) for government
to locate, gather, and store it en masse. Where we might have
previously expected most of these interactions to exist only in people’s
memory if anywhere at all (and to fade soon afterwards), video
surveillance allows officials to create permanent records of them that
might be accessed years after they occur.206

Moreover, the distinction between being watched by a neighbor and watched
(always, and in detail) by a law enforcement officer is constitutionally
significant. As the Supreme Court of Vermont recently observed, “the
protections of the Fourth Amendment are built around the recognition that one’s
relationship with a detached third party will be different than with an
investigating officer.”207 Accordingly, technologies that record and store data
for law enforcement use necessitate extra scrutiny. Significantly, in analyzing
206 Blitz, supra note 138, at 1356, 1408; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, 203 (2006)
(distinguishing between simply monitoring behavior and making it searchable, noting that “[d]igital technologies
change this balance—radically”); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 455 (2007) (“[C]itizens of this country largely expect the freedom
to move about in relative anonymity without the government keeping an individualized, turn-by-turn itinerary
of our comings and goings.”).
207 In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1178–79 (Vt. 2012).
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whether the government may withhold records requested under the Freedom of
Information Act to protect the privacy of individuals named in the records, the
Supreme Court has long recognized an interest in a “practical obscurity” that
effectively conceals personal details from the average observer.208 This
obscurity is undermined by the recording of information that can then be
searched at leisure for evidence of sensitive, embarrassing, or simply private
moments. As the Court has explained, the fact that “information regarding
personal matters . . . may be available to the public in some form” does not
extinguish a person’s “interest in controlling the dissemination of [the]
information.”209 There is, in other words, a “vast difference” between
information that could be found “after a diligent search” and information found
after “a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse.”210 This is
similar to the difference between tasking a police officer with following a
person’s movements, inevitably resulting in gaps and judgments about what to
collect or record, and setting a tireless electronic bloodhound to do the same
job.211
Technology has historically played a key role in this process, since “the
computer can accumulate and store information that would otherwise have
surely been forgotten long before a person attains age 80.”212 Databases of
information—while an inevitable and indispensable part of the modern
American bureaucratic state—have long raised red flags when it comes to
constitutionally-protected interests and the possibility of governmental abuse.213
Moreover, retaining such recordings just in case the information becomes
relevant in the future has shades of the general warrants that the Founders
despised, and is contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
individualized suspicion. It also brings to the fore the First Amendment concerns
described earlier, as those sensitive pieces of personal information can be

208 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762–63 (1989)
(balancing, in a FOIA case, the privacy interest in the “practical obscurity” of criminal rap sheets against the
“public interest in their release”).
209 U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994) (emphasis added).
210 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 764.
211 See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 48 (2013) (fleshing out and advocating for a legal notion of obscurity to protect privacy on the Internet).
212 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 771.
213 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Inaccuracies in
expansive, interconnected collections of electronic information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The central storage and easy accessibility
of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information . . . .”).
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accessed, used, and abused by the government to target dissidents, investigate
lawful activist groups, or blackmail people into becoming informants.
Again, this is not a baseless fear. In a scathing dissent to an en banc Ninth
Circuit decision allowing law enforcement to conduct DNA profiling of federal
offenders on probation, Judge Reinhardt warned of the:
[D]angers inherent in allowing the government to collect and store
information about its citizens in a centralized place. J. Edgar Hoover
terrorized leaders of the civil rights movement by exploiting the
information he collected in his files. Our government’s surveillance
and shameful harassment of suspected communists and alleged
communist-sympathizers in the middle of the twentieth century
depended largely on the centralization of information collected about
countless numbers of non-communist members of our citizenry—often
by means that violated the Fourth Amendment. The same was true of
the Palmer Raids a few decades earlier and of our roundup of Japanese
Americans and their placement in internment camps during World War
Two.
Even governments with benign intentions have proven unable to
regulate or use wisely vast stores of information they collect regarding
their citizens. The problem with allowing the government to collect
and maintain private information about the intimate details of our lives
is that the bureaucracy most often in charge of the information “is
poorly regulated and susceptible to abuse.”214

When surveillance technologies record while they watch, therefore, courts must
be alert to the risk that those recordings offer both a ready-made mosaic and a
virtual time machine, available for after-the-fact review and exploitation, and
law enforcement must be alert to the risk that their surveillance poses to Fourth
Amendment rights.
4. Intrusion into Private Areas
The fourth factor for courts and law enforcement to consider is whether the
technology reveals information about the inside of a private home that otherwise
would require a warrant or an invitation for law enforcement to enter. If so, that
will generally be dispositive.

214 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083
(2002)).
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Since the start of challenges to surveillance in public, the Supreme Court has
been sensitive to the risk that tracking technologies deployed in the open may
nevertheless reveal information about a person’s presence in a home or another
private area, space that is scrupulously protected by the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Karo, for instance, the Supreme
Court analyzed whether it was constitutional to plant, without a warrant, a beeper
in a can of ether that was delivered to a drug suspect and then carried inside a
private home.215 In light of United States v. Knotts, the Court was bound to hold
that using the beeper to track the suspect in public did not implicate any
constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy.216 When the can of ether
entered the private home, however, the calculus changed; at that point, the
presence of the beeper inside the home revealed information that police
otherwise would have had to get a warrant to obtain: that the subject was inside
the home as well.217 Notably, this was true even though visual observation of
Karo (which would not have required a warrant) could have shown that the can
entered the house; nevertheless, because the beeper revealed conclusively that
the can stayed in the house, “a fact that could not have been visually verified,”
a warrant was required.218
Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down the
warrantless use of a remote thermal imaging device used to detect the presence
of marijuana grow lights.219 The Court held that when the police use “senseenhancing technology” to obtain “any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,’” it is a search.220
This same solicitude regarding incidental disclosure of information about the
inside of a home—for instance, who is there and when—has been highlighted in
recent surveillance cases as well, especially with respect to cell phone
surveillance. For instance, the Florida Supreme Court, observed that:
[B]ecause cell phones are indispensable to so many people and are
normally carried on one’s person, cell phone tracking can easily invade
the right to privacy in one’s home or other private areas, a matter that

215
216
217
218
219
220

468 U.S 705, 707, 709–11 (1984).
Id. at 713–14.
Id. at 715.
Id.
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
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the government cannot always anticipate and one which, when it
occurs, is clearly a Fourth Amendment violation.221

A state court recently echoed this concern, reasoning:
[B]ecause the use of the cell site simulator in this case revealed the
location of the phone and [the defendant] inside a residence, we are
presented with the additional concern that an electronic device not in
general public use has been used to obtain information about the
contents of a home, not otherwise discernable without physical
intrusion. Under the applicable precedent, this is undoubtedly an
intrusion that rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment “search.”222

Thus, when a particular mode of surveillance is likely to enable the government
to glean information about a protected space, and when the police will not know
in advance that such information will be revealed and thus cannot avoid it, the
Fourth Amendment comes into play and a warrant will be required.
5. Erosion of Core Constitutional Rights
Regardless of how the factors above play out, there are certain activities and
certain categories of information that the Fourth Amendment has historically
protected. For instance, communications that a person seeks to keep private,
either by excluding “the uninvited ear,” as Charles Katz did,223 or by placing a
written communication into an envelope and sending it via the U.S. Postal
Service.224
Historically, protecting these communications from intrusion by the
government has been relatively straightforward: close the phone booth door or
seal the envelope. When technology has advanced enough to allow for
interception despite these measures, the courts have caught up and imposed
restrictions on the warrantless use of the technologies to ensure continued
protection for these historical rights. For instance, both the wiretap in Katz225
and the earlier “spike mike” that could be inserted directly into a house’s wall to
listen in on conversations were new technologies at the time, which the Court
ultimately required a warrant to use.226
221
222
223
224

Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 524 (Fla. 2014), reh’g denied (2014).
State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 349 (2016) (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733

(1877).
225
226

Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506–07 (1961).
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To be sure, the surveillance technologies canvassed in this paper primarily
reveal information about a person’s location or his or her activities in public, not
the content of communications. Inevitably, however, technologies employed in
public will enable the extraction of other types of information in unexpected
ways, including the content of communications and other data. Courts will thus
need to remain attentive to ensure that rights traditionally safeguarded by the
Fourth Amendment remain protected.227
In a recent study, for instance, a group of MIT researchers recreated a
conversation by remotely videotaping the vibrations triggered by the speech of
the speakers.228 Using a camera planted behind a sound-proof window, the
researchers captured minuscule vibrations on a potato chip bag and the leaves of
a plant, and crunched the data to reproduce the speech that created those
vibrations.229 Although the researchers used a sophisticated, high-speed camera,
they discovered that a much cheaper, consumer-grade camera would have
produced similar information as well.230 To take a less sci-fi example, an
observer trained in lip reading or sign language could use a surveillance camera,
particularly one equipped with a zoom feature or other enhanced capabilities, to
make out the content of a conversation without being physically present.
To be sure, conversations in public cannot always be expected to be private;
when we sit with a friend in a busy restaurant or on a street bench, we take the
risk that those around us may hear our conversation (though the very noise and
bustle of a public area can provide some practical obscurity as well). But when
we sit to talk to someone in a deserted café or a quiet corner, or when we keep
our voices hushed and our tone low, we expect that our conversation will be kept
just among the speakers; unanticipated, covert police surveillance that upends
that expectation may be constitutionally suspect.

227 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 524 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring)
(“[W]hen, historically, we have a more specific expectation of privacy in a particular type of information, the
more specific privacy interest must govern the Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479
(2015).
228 See, e.g., Rachel Feltman, MIT Researchers Can Listen to Your Conversation by Watching Your Potato
Chip Bag, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-ofscience/wp/2014/08/04/mit-researchers-can-listen-to-your-conversation-by-watching-your-potato-chip-bag/;
Glenn McDonald, Conversation Heard in Potato Chip Bag Vibrations, SEEKER (Aug. 7, 2014, 11:37 AM),
http://news.discovery.com/tech/gear-and-gadgets/conversation-heard-in-potato-chip-bag-vibrations-140807.
htm.
229 See supra note 228.
230 Id.
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Katz itself was premised on precisely this understanding. When Charles Katz
went to the pay phone to call his bookie, he closed the doors of the phone
booth.231 Once he was standing alone in the booth, he was entitled to operate on
the presumption that no one could hear him speak, or divine the content of his
conversation from afar.232 Because Katz had sought to “preserve” his
conversation “as private,” even though it was “in an area accessible to the
public,” it was “constitutionally protected” against intrusion.233 Katz’s progeny
recognize that if speakers take steps to preserve the privacy of their
conversations in public, even with no phone booth to protect them,
eavesdropping on those conversations by means of enhanced technology—
including one of the technologies described here or one not yet envisioned—
requires a warrant.234
Courts have repeatedly recognized that Fourth Amendment rights must keep
pace with technology. In then-Chief Justice Burger’s words, “the Framers . . .
intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would
far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.”235 More recently, as the
Supreme Court reiterated in United States v. Jones, “we must ‘assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”236
Thus, in a sharply critical concurrence in a case regarding historical cell site
records, Eleventh Circuit Judge Robin Rosenbaum explained that where
surveillance undermines our ability to “engage in activities in which we have
historically maintained protected privacy interests,” that surveillance may
violate the Fourth Amendment.237 Otherwise, “with every new technology, we

231

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
See id.
233 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53.
234 See, e.g., Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 208–09, 211 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing whether
mourners at a public gravesite, who challenged police’s warrantless installation of a microphone in an urn, took
affirmative steps to keep their conversations private even while in public); id. at 217 (noting that the possibility
of a violation of privacy is “increased when technological enhancements such as wiretaps are used”); United
States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects conversations that
cannot be heard except by means of artificial enhancement.”); cf. State v. Duchow, 749 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Wis.
2008) (analyzing when a speaker has reasonable expectation of privacy so as to trigger protections of wiretap
law against interception).
235 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
579 (1991).
236 565 U.S. 400, 420 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
237 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 525 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015).
232
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surrender more and more of our historically protected Fourth Amendment
interests to unreasonable searches and seizures.”238
Although Judge Rosenbaum was critiquing the third party doctrine, her
caution applies equally well to the personal information that may now be
revealed simply by virtue of being exposed in public:
[E]xisting Supreme Court precedent may fairly be construed to suggest
that where society has historically recognized a legitimate expectation
of privacy, we must continue to do so for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, even if, in our modern world, we must now
expose to [the public] information that we would have previously kept
private, in order to continue to participate fully in society. If we do not,
we will face the Hobson’s choice of leaving our historically recognized
Fourth Amendment rights at the door of the modern world or finding
ourselves locked out from it. That the Constitution will not abide.239

Our expectation of privacy in our communications, for example, has not waned
simply because e-mail, which generally must be shared with Internet service
providers, has largely replaced handwritten missives.240 Similarly, the Internet
was unknown to the Founders, but libraries were not.241 Privacy and First
Amendment interests in anonymous reading remain the same regardless of
location, whether “we research and read . . . online at home or in a coffee shop
instead of in hard copies of books and periodicals in the stacks of the library.”242
So, too, should certain core constitutional interests be protected whether they
occur within the privacy of the home, within the four walls of a phone booth, or
out in public.243 This factor is likely to come into play relatively infrequently,
but where it does, it will be critical for courts to be attentive to the preservation
of these constitutional rights.

238

Id. at 523–33.
Id. at 527.
240 Id. at 528–29.
241 Id. at 529.
242 Id.
243 See, e.g., Andrew Hilts, Christopher Parsons & Jeffrey Knockel, Every Step You Fake: A Comparative
Analysis of Fitness Tracker Privacy and Security, CITIZEN LAB (Feb. 2, 2016), https://citizenlab.org/
2016/02/fitness-tracker-privacy-and-security/ (noting that the majority of fitness tracking devices studies “emit
persistent unique identifiers” that permit tracking of their wearers even “when the device is not paired, and
connected to, a mobile device”).
239
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6. Combined Technologies
Finally, courts (and police) will need to pay special attention when
technologies are combined or multiplied. A license plate reader can be added to
a surveillance camera;244 cameras can be networked to allow for more granular
tracking;245 drones can host movement-detection sensors, infrared sensors, and
GPS capabilities;246 and more. Indeed, New York City’s Lower Manhattan
Security Initiative combines a range of surveillance capabilities:
[It] monitors 4,000 security cameras and license plate readers south of
Canal Street. The project uses feeds from both private and public
security cameras, which are all monitored 24 hours a day by the
NYPD. Using face and object-detection technology, the police can
track cars and people moving through 1.7 square miles in lower
Manhattan and even detect unattended packages.247

Similarly, the Fresno, California, Police Department recently launched a Real
Time Crime Center that allows instant access to hundreds of police, school, and
traffic cameras, along with license plate databases, a gunshot detection system,
and social media monitoring.248 Reports indicate that videos from police body
cameras and private surveillance camera systems may soon be added to the
mix.249
When technologies are layered on top of each other, the factors outlined
above will continue to guide the analysis, but some may take on special
resonance. Police-worn body cameras are unlikely to trigger Fourth Amendment
244

See LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 84, at 3.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 38.
246 See, e.g., Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/drones/#tech (last visited Oct. 29, 2016) (“Drones may also carry infrared cameras, heat
sensors, GPS, sensors that detect movement, and automated license plate readers”); Timberg, supra note 83
(noting that infrared sensors on drones can be used to track people at night).
247 Kelly, supra note 83; see also Tim Dees, NYPD’s New Surveillance System: Multifaceted Protection, or
a Little Orwellian?, POLICEONE.COM (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.policeone.com/police-products/
investigation/video-surveillance/articles/5993550-NYPDs-new-surveillance-system-Multifaceted-protectionor-a-little-Orwellian/; Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super Computer
System that Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate Readers and Crime Reports, DAILY NEWS (Aug.
8, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer-systemdata-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reports-article-1.1132135.
248 See Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat ‘Score’, WASH.
POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveillingyou-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html; see also
Rory Appleton, Fresno Police Unveil State-of-the-Art Crime Tracking System, FRESNO BEE (July 7, 2015, 7:00
AM), http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime/article26671756.html.
249 Appleton, supra note 248.
245
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coverage on their own, for instance, but when the resulting videos are knitted
together, or biometric recognition technology is added, the juiced-up
surveillance technology that results may implicate constitutionally-protected
privacy interests.
***
An important question has been left unanswered: in this fact-dependent
inquiry, what weight are courts to give to each factor? Is one factor, standing
alone, enough to determine that law enforcement has engaged in a search? Must
there be three or four factors? How are courts and law enforcement to be guided
in this inquiry?
As a practical matter, given their interconnectedness, it is highly likely that
where one factor comes into play, others will follow. For instance, the reduced
cost of surveillance (the second factor) makes it possible to aggregate large
quantities of information over a period of time and create a mosaic (the concern
animating the first factor). Such an aggregation will often be exploitable only if
a recording is created, as reflected in the third factor. Moreover, as described
below, any technology that is highly likely to reveal information about a private
area that would otherwise be available only with a warrant, particularly where
law enforcement cannot guard in advance against receiving such information,
should be used only with a warrant; that factor is, in effect, a trump card.
The most difficult cases may be those in which, for instance, the duration is
a bit longer than those in which courts so far have concluded that a warrant is
not required, but not so long as to obviously require probable cause. In those
cases, the other factors will be of particular relevance to the court, and it is likely
that the good-faith exception will come into play until the doctrine solidifies.
Similarly, police will need to pay particular attention to the overall impact of
their surveillance technologies in determining, before the fact, whether they are
likely to implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
First Amendment principles will also play a critical role in this analysis.250
In Yale Kamisar’s words: “What good is freedom of speech or freedom of
250 See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Privacy, though
not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, is essential to the exercise of other rights guaranteed by it.”); Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469–70 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]e must bear in mind that
historically the search and seizure power was used to suppress freedom of speech and of the press . . . .”); Marcus
v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717, 724, 729 (1961)
(“Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope
of the search and seizure power.”); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030,
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religion or any other freedom if law enforcement officers have unfettered power
to violate a person’s privacy and liberty when he sits in his home or drives his
car or walks the streets?”251 Of course, most Fourth Amendment cases will not
themselves involve rights to free speech or freedom of association; because these
cases turn on the treatment by law enforcement of a criminal defendant, it is
more likely that the defendant will stand accused of robbing a bank or
transporting narcotics than trying to organize comrades for political advocacy.
But as Judge Learned Hand exhorted in United States v. Kirschenblatt, we must
not “forget that what seems fair enough against a squalid huckster of bad liquor
may take on a very different face, if used by a government determined to
suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition.”252 Judges should thus
take into account the potential impact of the surveillance on foundational First
Amendment values in determining how to weigh the factors in closer cases.
C. What Process Is Necessary?
When a court weighs the factors articulated above and concludes that the
Fourth Amendment comes into play, what happens next? Where a given use of
surveillance rises to the level of a search, the appropriate process will normally
be a warrant, the sine qua non of Fourth Amendment protections.253 It has not
always been obvious, however, how to meet the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement in the context of public space surveillance. The section
below proposes a framework by which surveillance in public could be carried
out consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and suggests that when the
particularity standard cannot be met, the surveillance must be narrowed or
discontinued. It also argues that the “special needs” doctrine, while superficially
appealing in the context of law enforcement actions to deter or detect crime and
terrorism, is rarely germane when it comes to law enforcement surveillance.

1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
one of the main reasons for adoption of the Fourth Amendment was to provide citizens with the privacy
protection necessary for secure enjoyment of First Amendment liberties.”); see also Thomas P. Crocker, The
Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 353 (2010) (“[P]olitical liberty is realized in the
company of others, most notably in the freedom to associate with others and to peaceably assemble. These are
public activities, not activities that remain private and undisclosed to others.”).
251 Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment and Its Exclusionary Rule, 15 THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 1991,
at 20, 21.
252 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
253 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (“To say that the Fourth Amendment applies here
is the beginning point, not the end of the analysis.”).
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1. Warrants and Particularity
The promises of the Fourth Amendment are backstopped by the requirement
that, in almost all cases, the police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause
to carry out a search. As the Supreme Court held in Katz, “searches conducted
outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”254 The Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated the supremacy of
the warrant as a bulwark against overreach, observing that “the warrant
requirement is ‘an important working part of our machinery of government,’ not
merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow “weighed” against the claims of police
efficiency.’”255
Furthermore, the mere fact that a warrant might impose certain logistical
hurdles does not abrogate its status as a Fourth Amendment baseline. As Justice
White has said, it is “hardly a compelling argument” against a warrant
requirement to say that it would “oblige the Government to obtain warrants in a
large number of cases.”256 Thus, when the Fourth Amendment comes into play,
the presumptive standard is that a warrant is necessary.
To be valid, a warrant must meet constitutional tailoring standards: the
Fourth Amendment requires warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”257 Searches that do not or
cannot satisfy this limitation—searches that are not susceptible to being
described in this way because they are so broad-based—are constitutionally
intolerable even with a warrant, since the only warrant that could accurately
describe their scope would approach the general warrants that the Founders
loathed.258

254 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014) (holding that where “a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing,” the Fourth Amendment “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant”).
255 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
256 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984); see also King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble
objectives than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The Fourth
Amendment must prevail.”).
257 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
258 See, e.g., In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1183 (Vt. 2012) (“The purpose of the particularity
requirement is to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to specific areas and specific things,
the particularity requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not
become a wide-ranging, exploratory search that the Fourth Amendment prohibits.” (citations omitted)).
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This is particularly true of the type of unfocused, long-term surveillance
enabled by many of the technologies described here. As one court explained:
If law enforcement anticipates that a suspect will commit a crime some
place at some future date, does that mean that law enforcement has
probable cause to track a suspect every place he goes? The answer
must be “No,” lest general warrants be revived and the Fourth
Amendment’s particularly requirement be eviscerated. . . .
Thus, when a law enforcement officer is queried by a magistrate as
to where he wants to electronically track a suspect’s movements,
“everywhere” seldom, if ever, will be an acceptable answer.259

What, then, would a warrant scheme look like in the context of tracking an
individual in public? How can the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment be met when it is impossible to particularly describe the place to be
searched because the place may be every place the target goes over the course
of a month? And how can the particularity mandate be squared with a search
that sweeps in large quantities of information about innocent persons, as with a
Stingray?260
The case law and the rules governing criminal proceedings in federal courts,
taken together, suggest that when public space surveillance does rise to the level
of a search, and a warrant is thus required, the following limitations apply: the
warrant should be designed to make the information collection as narrow as
feasible; the search must be reasonably limited in time; the search may not be
constitutionally permissible at all if it will, de facto, obtain vastly more
information than is relevant and necessary; and additional back-end
minimization procedures may be necessary (but cannot substitute for front-end
controls).
One magistrate judge, for example, recently imposed both ex ante and ex
post limitations on the government’s use of a Stingray device to bring the
surveillance into compliance with the Fourth Amendment.261 In that case, the
judge was particularly concerned about the “inevitable . . . . collection of

259

United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 627 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
Orin S. Kerr has suggested that it may be impracticable to meet the particularity requirement in the
context of surveillance in public. Kerr, supra note 170, at 339. As detailed in this section, I believe that objection
is manageable; a warrant often can be made particular enough to satisfy the constitutional standards. Where it
cannot, the answer is not that a warrant is not needed but that the surveillance must be narrowed.
261 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Relating to Tels. Used by Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015
WL 6871289, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015).
260
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innocent third parties’ information” via Stingray.262 When the government
submitted an application for a warrant to use a Stingray, the court therefore
required three steps to limit the collection, retention, and use of the information
gathered.263
First, police officers had to “make reasonable efforts to minimize the capture
of signals from cell phones used by people other than the target of the
investigation.”264 For example, the signal of the Stingray had to be as narrowly
targeted as possible. Perhaps more importantly, officers were prohibited from
using a Stingray “when, because of the location and time, an inordinate number
of innocent third parties’ information will be collected”—for instance, while
standing outside a sports arena during a big event.265 Second, all extraneous
data—everything besides information identifying the particular phone used by
the target—had to be destroyed within forty-eight hours after it was captured,
and could not be held for searching down the line.266 Finally, there was a total
ban on the use of information about third parties.267
Courts have applied similar restrictions to video surveillance, borrowing
generally from the strict requirements for electronic wiretap orders authorized
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.268 For
instance, in Cuevas-Sanchez, a pole camera case,269 the order authorizing the
installation of the camera limited the surveillance to thirty days and required the
police to “minimize observation of innocent conduct and to discontinue the
surveillance when none of the suspected participants were on the premises.”270
The Seventh Circuit has also imported the strict Title III requirements into the
video surveillance context, holding that a warrant for video surveillance must
limit the surveillance to thirty days maximum (with renewals available upon

262

Id.
Id. at 3–4; accord State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 360 (2016) (emphasizing the importance of both ex
ante and ex post restrictions on Stingray use, holding that “[t]o allow the government to collect real-time location
information on an unknown number of private cell phones, without any geographic boundaries, without any
reporting requirements or requirements that any unrelated data be deleted, and without a showing of probable
cause that contraband or evidence of a particular crime will be found through the particular manner in which the
search is conducted would certainly run afoul of the Fourth Amendment”).
264 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Relating to Tels. Used by Suppressed, 2015 WL 6871289, at
*3.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 4.
267 Id.
268 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2), 2518(7) (2012).
269 See supra note 92.
270 United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 249–50 (5th Cir. 1987).
263
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judicial approval) and “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception.”271
Judges have imposed similar restrictions on the collection of electronic
information as well. For instance, in a case relating to the 2013 mass shooting at
the Washington Navy Yard, Magistrate Judge John Facciola chastised the
government for seeking from Facebook a wide swath of information not only
about the shooter but also about third parties with whom he had communicated
or intersected in some way.272 In response to the government’s broad demand,
the court crafted an order outlining the categories of information that the
government was permitted to seize and those it was not.273 The court also
imposed after-the-fact minimization procedures to ensure that the government
ended up in possession of only the information that was relevant to its
investigation.274 In light of the government’s attempt to obtain far more
information than was germane to the investigation, Judge Facciola warned that
in the future, he might take steps to narrow the initial search parameters much
more substantially.275
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc blasted the government in United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing for overreaching, manipulation, and
misrepresentation in its investigation of baseball players suspected of taking
steroids.276 Federal authorities obtained a warrant to search the facilities of
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. for the records of ten players as to whom they
had probable cause.277 When the warrant was served, however, “the government
seized and promptly reviewed the drug testing records for hundreds of players
in Major League Baseball (and a great many other people).”278
Because the information was already in the government’s hands, the en banc
court focused on affirming the lower court’s orders directing the government to
destroy or return the data that was outside the scope of the warrant.279 More
271 United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883–84 (7th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Biasucci, 786
F.2d 504, 507–10, 512 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the reasoning from Torres to a similar challenge against video
surveillance).
272 In re Search of Info. Associated with Facebook Account Identified by Username Aaron.Alexis that is
Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6–9 (D.D.C. 2013).
273 Id. at 5–6.
274 Id. at 9–11.
275 Id. at 11.
276 621 F.3d 1162, 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
277 Id. at 1166.
278 Id.
279 See id. at 1167.
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generally, however, the court warned that law enforcement’s need to examine
many electronic records as part of its search for a smaller universe of relevant
materials “creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information
will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment
irrelevant.”280
In concurrence, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski set out a detailed set of
minimization protocols to ensure that law enforcement agents reviewed only
information strictly relevant to the investigation.281 Following the guidance in
Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Supreme Court of Vermont subsequently
confirmed that front-end restrictions can be “acceptable mechanisms for
ensuring the particularity of a search.”282
The restrictions above are relevant when a method of surveillance will
capture information about a large number of people who are not related to the
purpose of the search, but what about when the surveillance technology will be
focused on an individual person and will collect information about that one
person over a long period of time?
As with the examples above, the surveillance must still be tailored to collect
information that is related to the probable cause of a crime that underlies the
warrant. Thus, in United States v. White, the DEA obtained a search warrant
authorizing agents to track Jimmie White II, a suspected drug trafficker,
continuously for thirty days using his cell phone.283 After White challenged the
evidence gleaned through the cell phone tracking, a federal district court in
Michigan concluded both that White “had a subjective expectation [of privacy]
in his movements over time” and that that expectation was one society would
recognize as reasonable.284 While acknowledging that it is difficult to identify
the precise point at which surveillance crosses the line into a Fourth Amendment
search, the court reasoned that surveillance for over four weeks—particularly
for a “garden variety drug trafficking crime”—is a “breach of one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.”285 In light of that expectation, the surveillance had to be

280
281
282
283
284
285

Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1180 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1170 (Vt. 2012).
United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 619 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.
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underpinned by a warrant hewing to the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.286
The court ruled that the warrant had failed to satisfy the particularity standard
because it authorized tracking for an extended time period in both public and
private places.287 Had the DEA instead “present[ed] a more tailored application
for a warrant,” they could have “satisfied the particularity requirement.”288 “For
instance, the agent could have . . . appli[ed] . . . to track White for a limited
period based on credible information that White was planning to engage in a
drug transaction with the confidential informant at a particular time and
place.”289 He could have provided information about the particular suppliers
White was traveling to meet, allowing surveillance along those routes (even
including overnight stays).290 Or he could have suggested that White “stored
drugs in one location and sold them out of another,” and needed to be tracked
between the two locations.291
Finally, where public surveillance technologies fall into the category of
“tracking devices,” Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure imposes
specific warrant requirements.292 A tracking device is an “electronic . . . device
which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object”—for
instance, the beeper used in Knotts and Karo.293 Under Rule 41, a warrant for a
tracking device must “identify the person or property to be tracked” and “specify
a reasonable length of time that the device may be used,” which cannot exceed
forty-five days (though forty-five day extensions are possible).294 The person
being tracked must also be notified of the tracking within a certain period of time
after the tracking ends—generally ten days.295

286 Id. at 627; see also United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (detailing the
probable cause standard to be met for real-time cell phone tracking, including demonstrating that the person’s
location (particularly in protected places) is actually relevant to the crime at issue, and showing that both the
specific cell phone and the person to be tracked are relevant to the investigation).
287 White, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 628–29.
288 Id. at 628.
289 Id.; see also id. at 628–29 (holding that a warrant “allow[ing] the police to track White at all times, night
and day, on public streets and in private places, and into areas traditionally protected by the Fourth Amendment”
was “akin to the general warrants condemned by the Founders” and was “repugnant to the Fourth Amendment”).
290 Id. at 628.
291 Id.
292 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
293 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (“As used in this section, the term ‘tracking device’ means an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”).
294 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
295 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(C).
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Police-attached GPS devices would certainly qualify as tracking devices.296
While cell phones permit the tracking of individuals, federal courts are currently
split on whether they should legally be categorized as tracking devices, since
they have many functions and are carried voluntarily.297 Some courts have also
held that historical cell site location information counts as information from a
tracking device, meaning a warrant based on probable cause would be required
to obtain that information;298 critically, the owner of the phone would also need
to be notified of the request.299
Where a warrant is required for a tracking device, there is still an open
question as to what satisfies the probable cause requirement.300 Some courts
have held that simply identifying the person and the phone number to be tracked
is sufficient.301 Others have identified the same concerns animating the warrant
296

18 U.S.C. § 3117 (defining mobile tracking devices).
See The Honorable Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of
Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 44–45 (2013) (arguing that requests
for access to cell site location information “should be filed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure”). Compare United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[A] cell phone is
not a ‘tracking device . . . .’”), and In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 150
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that a cell phone is not a tracking device), and In re Applications of U.S. for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D. Mass. 2007) (same), and In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same), with United States v. Turner, 781
F.3d 374, 385 (8th Cir. 2015) (assuming without deciding that the defendant’s cell phone should be treated as a
tracking device), and In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010) (suggesting that while historical cell site
location information likely does not count as information from a tracking device, prospective or real-time cell
site information might), and In re Order Authorizing Prospective & Continuous Release of Cell Site Location
Records, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 899 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (concluding that “prospective, continuous, and
contemporaneous cell site monitoring” “converts a smartphone into a tracking device”), and United States v.
White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 624 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding that “a cell phone emitting geolocation data” fits
into the definition of “tracking device” under 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b)), and In re Application of U.S. for & Order:
(1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other
Info.; (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (“The
bottom line is that cell phones undoubtedly have become ‘electronic . . . device[s] which permit[] the tracking
of the movement of a person or object.’ They are tracking devices.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006))).
298 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Use of a Pen Register with Caller
Identification Device Cell Site Location Auth. on a Cellular Tel., 2009 WL 159187, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2009) (concluding that cell site location information is information from a tracking device).
299 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(C).
300 See In re Application of U.S. for & Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace
Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based
Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d at 581 (“Applying Rule 41 to CSLI requests also raises the issue of what precisely is
meant by the requirement of probable cause in this context.”).
301 See, e.g., United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740, 772–73 (D. Md. 2013) (approving of
applications to “ping” phone in order to locate it because, among other things, applications identified the number
297

LEVINSON-WALDMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

588

2/22/2017 1:18 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:527

restrictions described above; one court held, for instance, that to obtain a warrant
to track a cell phone, police must demonstrate that “tracking the phone will lead
to evidence of a crime,” not simply that the phone is related to a crime, or that
“a person has a cell phone and is engaged in criminal conduct.”302 This will be
an area of further doctrinal development.
One last note: while upfront tailoring will be necessary to keep surveillance
warrants within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment,303 after-the-fact
minimization requirements may be appropriate as well. Thus, for instance, a
police department might need to delete excess video or cell phone records.304
Any such deletion would need to comply with the government’s obligations
under Brady v. Maryland.305
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
While the warrant is the presumptive Fourth Amendment standard, there are
certain scenarios in which a warrant is not required even though a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred. Even in those circumstances, however, “the
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”—that is, the search
must still be “reasonable” to pass constitutional muster.306

of the targeted cell phone and its user, even though the showing of probable cause only linked the individual to
criminal activity rather than linking the phone itself); State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 810 (Wis. 2014) (approving
an order authorizing use of a Stingray and ruling that identifying the electronic serial number associated with
the defendant’s cell phone “satisfie[d] the particularity requirement because that number permits a particularized
collection of cell site information for only one cell phone”).
302 In re Application of U.S. for & Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device;
(2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based Servs.,
727 F. Supp. 2d at 584.
303 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 192, 198 (D.D.C. 2015) (enjoining the National
Security Agency’s bulk collection of telephone metadata (albeit only with respect to the individual plaintiffs),
holding that the unfettered acquisition and retention of vast databases of information was unconstitutional even
if the government imposed limitations on its ability to search the data in the future).
304 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“[T]o the extent such papers were not
within the scope of the warrants or were otherwise improperly seized, the State was correct in returning them
voluntarily and the trial judge was correct in suppressing others.”); In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1185–
86 (Vt. 2012) (approving both before-the-fact restrictions and after-the-fact minimization requirements imposed
upon use of data extracted from electronic devices).
305 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
306 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
(“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’. . . .”); United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992)
(“‘[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard’ under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
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Two exceptions will most often be invoked to justify a warrantless search
via surveillance in public: exigent circumstances and special needs. They are
briefly described below, with closer attention to the special needs doctrine,
which allows for warrantless searches carried out for non-law enforcement
purposes.307 This doctrine has become something of a catch-all justification for
searches that are ostensibly for the purpose of deterring crime or terrorism.308
This section ultimately concludes, however, that when surveillance in public
space rises to the level of a search, it is almost always for a law enforcement
purpose, and thus requires a warrant.
a. Exigent Circumstances Exception
The exception for exigent circumstances comes into play when taking the
time to obtain a warrant would put an individual’s life or safety at risk—for
instance, where a police officer needs to ensure that a suspect has been disarmed,
prevent evidence from being destroyed, or chase a fleeing suspect in “hot
pursuit.”309 In these cases, the warrant requirement gives way.
This exception would remain in place when it comes to real-time use of
cutting-edge surveillance technologies, which might be deployed quite
effectively to find or track an individual in an emergency. For example, a
surveillance camera that zooms in on and follows an individual suspected of
fleeing a murder scene until an officer can apprehend him, or a drone pressed
into use to locate a victim of kidnapping where there are credible risks of
imminent harm, would not typically require a warrant. As described below,
longer-term individual tracking would still generally require a warrant.310
b. Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs exception also permits law enforcement to warrantlessly
undertake certain searches that might otherwise require a warrant. The search

307
308

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979).
Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 846

(2010).
309 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (authorizing search of arrestee to search
for weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (hot
pursuit).
310 See infra Parts III.C, III.D.
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must be for a non-law enforcement-related purpose; a search that simply
vindicates a “general interest in crime control” does not satisfy a special need.311
Whether searches for public safety qualify as a special need is a particularly
knotty question. As argued below, the types of generalized surveillance typically
deployed for public safety purposes frequently will not rise to the level of a
search under the test articulated here.312 When they do, however, can they be
saved by the special needs analysis? Courts and commentators diverge over
whether public safety qualifies as a special need.313 I argue that public space
surveillance that does constitute a search is not fundamentally in service of
public safety: there is little empirical evidence that these surveillance
technologies contribute to public safety, and their primary utility is clearly for
identifying and locating suspects, a paradigmatic law enforcement goal.
i. Background
The special needs doctrine grew out of the need to search residential
apartments to root out hidden violations of housing safety laws. In Camara v.
Municipal Court, the Supreme Court first endorsed “administrative searches” of
private homes to vindicate public safety regulations that could not be satisfied
in any other way.314 As long as there were “reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection” that were “satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling,” then probable cause to issue a warrant
presumptively existed.315 Unlike with a criminal warrant, the inspector did not
have to show specific knowledge about the particular house or apartment, but an
ex ante warrant was nevertheless required.316

311 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n.18; see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that special needs searches “must be justified, always, by concerns ‘other than crime
detection’” (citation omitted)); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 833 (2002) (noting, in approving drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities, that “the test
results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority”); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84
(2001) (striking down a hospital’s program to require all pregnant women to undergo drug tests because the
program was designed in close coordination with law enforcement and the hospital planned to provide all
positive results to the police); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (“We have never approved
a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. . . . [W]e
would not credit the ‘general interest in crime control’ as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops.”).
312 See infra Part II.C.2.b.ii.
313 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 308, at 886 (discussing issue and collecting citations on both sides).
314 387 U.S. 523, 534, 537 (1967).
315 Id. at 538.
316 Id.
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Two decades later, Justice Blackmun explicitly articulated the special needs
doctrine in a case analyzing the propriety of an assistant vice principal’s
warrantless search of a high school freshman’s purse.317 Because a warrant was
“unsuited” to the school environment, the majority in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
concluded that “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”318 Justice Blackmun
elaborated in a frequently cited concurrence, explaining:
Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.319

As the Court subsequently emphasized in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
programs undertaken to “detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,”
even where the “gravity of the threat” is high, cannot be justified as a special
need.320 Instead, the purpose must be something other than “crime detection.”321
Notwithstanding this implicit limitation on the scope of the doctrine, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have endorsed a range of special needs searches
and seizures in the decades since T.L.O.: drug tests of student athletes322 and
railway employees,323 searches of public employees’ workplaces for
evidence,324 stops on public highways looking for evidence of drunk driving or
illegal immigrants325 (though not possession of illegal drugs),326 searches of

317

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 340–41.
319 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
320 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 (2001) (striking
down program requiring pregnant women to be tested for drugs because “the immediate objective of the searches
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes”).
321 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
322 See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 664–65 (1995); see also Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (permitting drug testing of
students involved in extracurricular activities).
323 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (permitting drug testing of railway
employees involved in train accidents).
324 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
325 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (permitting suspicionless stop to question
occupants of car regarding immigration status).
326 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40, 48 (2000) (prohibiting suspicionless stops
for drug possession); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (permitting suspicionless
sobriety checkpoint).
318
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travelers’ bags in a subway system,327 and more. As criminal law scholar
Stephen Schulhofer has put it,
“[A]dministrative” scrutiny of homes, offices, personal effects, and
even peoples’ bodies has proliferated to the point where many
Americans encounter these searches regularly at work, in schools, at
the airport, on the highways, or in trains and buses. The once obscure
administrative search doctrine now matters enormously in our daily
lives.328

ii. Detection and Deterrence of Crime and Terrorism Is Not a Special
Need
The warrant exception for special needs has had particular force where the
government has asserted an interest in preventing acts of terrorism and other
crimes. But categorizing the detection and prevention of crime, including
terrorism, as a special need calls for considerable skepticism. Anticipating
possible criminal acts, attempting to prevent them, and investigating them when
they occur are, as the Supreme Court noted in Edmond, paradigmatic law
enforcement functions;329 they are notably dissimilar from the regulatory
enforcement scheme approved in Camara330 or even the public secondary school
search in T.L.O.331 To call these objectives a “special need,” beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, would be to wring the phrase of meaning.
To be sure, some would argue that terrorism is not “ordinary criminal
wrongdoing.”332 Even exceptionally grave criminal threats, however, do not
thereby trigger a special needs analysis—as the Edmond Court made clear.333 At
bottom, terrorism is a criminal act or, more often, a set of interconnected
criminal acts. And experts, including the 9/11 Commission, suggest that it is

327 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding searches in New York City subway
system for purpose of preventing terrorist attacks).
328 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 95 (2012). Professor Schulhofer has also offered one mechanism for distinguishing between
types of special needs cases, differentiating those that involve the government’s regulation of essentially private
behavior (for instance, driving on the road) from those that involve governmental employees or partners (for
instance, public school students). Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding
Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 118.
329 See Edmund, 531 U.S. at 43–44.
330 Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
331 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
332 See Edmund, 531 U.S. at 41–42.
333 See id. at 42.
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those criminal acts that provide the most promising opportunity to disrupt a
terrorist plot.334
Allowing warrantless searches via surveillance would also make terrorism
the camel’s nose under the tent.335 The Eleventh Circuit has most clearly
articulated the risks of justifying surveillance on the grounds of perceived risks
from terrorism. In Bourgeois v. Peters, a Georgia city argued that “post
September 11,” municipalities needed to be able to employ a magnetometer, or
metal detector, at large gatherings in the absence of individualized suspicion.336
The court rejected this bid, observing:
While the threat of terrorism is omnipresent, we cannot use it as the
basis for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections
in any large gathering of people. In the absence of some reason to
believe that international terrorists would target or infiltrate this
protest, there is no basis for using September 11 as an excuse for
searching the protestors.337

The court acknowledged that “both protestors and passersby [might] be safer if
the City were permitted to engage in mass, warrantless, suspicionless
searches.”338 Nevertheless, the panel concluded,
[T]he Fourth Amendment embodies a value judgment by the Framers
that prevents us from gradually trading ever-increasing amounts of
freedom and privacy for additional security. It establishes searches

334

See, e.g., MARY DEROSA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, DATA MINING AND DATA ANALYSIS
COUNTERTERRORISM 12 (2004), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/040301_data_mining_report.pdf
(“Detecting combinations of these low-level activities—such as illegal immigration, operating front businesses,
money transfers, use of drop boxes and hotel addresses for commercial activities, and having multiple
identities—could help predict terrorist plots.”); SIOBHAN O’NEIL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34014,
TERRORIST PRECURSOR CRIMES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
terror/RL34014.pdf (“In order to meet [their] needs, terrorists engage in a series of activities, some of which are
legal, many of which are not, including various fraud schemes, petty crime, identity and immigration crimes, the
counterfeit of goods, narcotics trade, and illegal weapons procurement, amongst others.”); see also M. ELAINE
NUGENT ET AL., AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., LOCAL PROSECUTORS’ RESPONSE TO TERRORISM (2005),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211202.pdf; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 181–82, 192–93 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/
911Report.pdf. Similarly, the would-be Millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam and his collaborators “were
reported to all be involved in a series of criminal activities, to include credit card fraud, pick pocketing,
shoplifting, and stealing identity documents.” O’NEIL, supra, at 20.
335 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E.D. of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972)
(prohibiting the government from engaging in warrantless surveillance of alleged domestic terrorists).
336 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
337 Id. at 1311.
338 Id. at 1311–12.
FOR
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based on evidence—rather than potentially effective, broad,
prophylactic dragnets—as the constitutional norm.339

As the Third Circuit recently observed, “the same rigorous [constitutional]
standards” must be applied “even where national security is at stake.”340
Moreover, even if crime and terrorism detection and deterrence did qualify
as non-law enforcement-related needs, surveillance in public space would be a
poor mechanism for accomplishing that goal. Courts require a fit between the
special need asserted and the means proposed to address it;341 a broad and
indefinite monitoring scheme that is not narrowly targeted to the articulated
threat is unlikely to pass constitutional muster.342
In Camara, for instance, the Supreme Court observed that there was
“unanimous agreement” that the “only effective way” to ensure compliance with
housing codes was through in-person inspections.343 By contrast, in striking
down a program of highway stops for the purpose of checking motorists’ license
and registration, the Justices in Delaware v. Prouse emphasized that while the
state had an important interest in ensuring that only authorized drivers were on
the road, the spot checks were not a “sufficiently productive mechanism to
justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests.”344 Similarly, the Court
has noted that the suspicionless checkpoint programs it has approved were
“designed primarily to serve purposes closely related” to the relevant problems,
be they border security or roadway safety from drunk drivers.345
In the context of potential violence or terrorism, courts have also required a
connection between the public safety threat and the method of addressing it. In
Stauber v. City of New York, for instance, a New York district court rejected the
New York City Police Department’s plan to search all attendees’ bags prior to
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Id. at 1312.
Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2015) (urging that even where the animating
goal of surveillance is to prevent an act of terrorism, history teaches that “we must be . . . vigilant in protecting
constitutional rights”).
341 Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
2004).
342 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995) (“Finally, we turn to consider the
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.”);
Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 193 (D.D.C. 2015) (“I must also evaluate the efficacy of the searches
at issue in meeting this need.”).
343 Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967) (emphasis added).
344 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
345 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (emphasis added).
340
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demonstrations opposing the 2004 Republican National Convention.346 The city
argued that there could be an “increased risk of violence or of threats to public
safety” if the NYPD was not allowed to conduct a dragnet bag search, citing to
the fact that the federal government believed the Convention could be a target
of terrorist attacks.347 Rebuffing that argument, the court observed that the city
had offered only a “general invocation of terrorist threats,” with no showing of
how the searches would mitigate the threat.348
To be sure, courts have approved suspicionless searches for the ostensible
purpose of terrorism or threat mitigation. Even in those circumstances, however,
they have emphasized the limits on the searches, indicating that a broad program
of suspicionless surveillance would not pass muster.349
Critically, when it comes to surveillance in public space, there is little
compelling evidence that surveillance actually succeeds in deterring most
crime.350 This thin record of efficacy suggests that the true function of many
surveillance technologies will be to collect evidence of criminal activity for use
during an investigation or prosecution—certainly a law enforcement purpose.
As the Bourgeois court observed, while this would assuredly be useful, that is
not the same as being constitutional.351
These and other special needs cases thus counsel strongly against permitting
warrantless, broad-scale surveillance in the name of crime and terrorism
detection and prevention. Importantly, this does not mean that cities can never
use surveillance in support of public safety; as described below,352 there are
346

2004 WL 1593870, at *33.
Id. at *31.
348 Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d 317, 322–23 (Mass. 2004) (ruling that stops of
drivers on a rural road with no suspicion of any wrongdoing, solely because the road abutted a reservoir thought
to be potential target for terrorism, were unconstitutional).
349 See, e.g., Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing and relying on extensive findings
from the Department of Homeland Security about dangers to ferries and methods to ameliorate risks in endorsing
warrantless searches of ferry riders traveling from Vermont to New York to combat possible terrorist attacks);
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04–11652–GAO, 2004 WL 1682859,
at *4 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) (permitting suspicionless searches of all buses passing by the Boston convention
center where the Democratic National Convention was taking place, but only during the four-day period of the
convention); cf. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264–65, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasizing, in upholding the
constitutionality of bag inspections of riders on the New York City subway system, the method by which the
NYPD carried out the searches, including providing notice of the searches to all entering passengers, allowing
individuals who did not wish to be searched to leave the system, and relying on a formula that ostensibly gave
law enforcement personnel “virtually no discretion”).
350 See supra Part I.B.3.
351 Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
352 See, e.g., infra Parts III.C, F.
347
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circumstances in which surveillance in public does not rise to the level of a
search, meaning that it need not meet constitutional standards of reasonableness.
However, where surveillance in public is transformed into a search according to
the multi-part test articulated above, the special needs doctrine will rarely, if
ever, save law enforcement from needing a warrant.
D. First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The discussion so far has focused on the elements that form the foundation
for a Fourth Amendment claim, but one final point remains to be addressed.
What happens when a protest, demonstration, or other public event occurs within
a public space, and surveillance technologies that do not otherwise constitute a
search intentionally focus on persons exercising their First Amendment rights?
The Fourth Amendment may not be capacious enough to cover that activity,
particularly in light of Supreme Court doctrine holding that the motive behind a
stop or search is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis.353
That is not, however, the end of the constitutional inquiry. When surveillance
is deliberately focused on the exercise of First Amendment rights or undertaken
in retaliation for the exercise of such rights, whether or not any resulting harm
is intended, the targets may have viable First Amendment claims in response.354
In light of revelations that the federal government has monitored activists
engaged in lawful activities in support of Black Lives Matter, for instance, this
avenue is particularly salient.355 In addition, when surveillance is
disproportionately focused at particular racial, ethnic, or religious groups, claims

353

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
See, e.g., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1064 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (“[A]ll investigative techniques are subject to abuse and can conceivably be used to oppress citizens and
groups, rather than to further proper law enforcement goals. In some cases, bad faith use of these techniques
may constitute an abridgment of the First Amendment rights of the citizens at whom they are directed . . . .”).
355 See, e.g., George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson, THE
INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/documents-show-departmenthomeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson; see also Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 288
F. Supp. 2d 411, 420–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (limiting the NYPD’s use of videotaping of demonstrations due to
previous harassment for exercise of First Amendment rights); GLOBAL JUSTICE INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT-PROTECTED EVENTS FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES
4
(2011),
https://www.ncirc.gov/onlinetraining/modules/first_amendment_rollcall/
Recommendations.pdf (proposing best practices for law enforcement activity at First Amendment-protected
events, including suggesting that “taking pictures and videos of the event” and “[c]ollecting . . . identifying
information (such as license plates) of participants, people in the area, counterdemonstrators, or bystanders
watching the event” would be a “red flag”).
354
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may be available under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.356
The Third Circuit, for instance, recently considered allegations that the
NYPD had spied on Muslim activists and community members because of their
religious affiliation and activities, core interests protected by the First
Amendment.357 The NYPD was said to have targeted mosque attendees by
taking pictures and videos, collecting their license plate numbers, and directing
surveillance cameras at religious centers to identify the congregants, causing the
plaintiffs to significantly curtail their religious activity.358 In ruling that the
plaintiffs could move ahead with their case, the court in Hassan v. City of New
York was clear: discriminatory surveillance can cause real harms, and those
harms can give rise to viable First Amendment claims.359
The court distinguished Hassan from Laird v. Tatum, a seminal 1972
Supreme Court case on the chilling effects of surveillance.360 In Laird, a group
of citizens challenged a surveillance and information-collection program that
was implemented by the U.S. Army in the wake of the 1967 riots in Detroit and
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.361 The plaintiffs could not show that
the Army had taken any action against them,362 however, and as the appeals
court put it, “the information gathered is nothing more than a good newspaper
reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public meetings and the
clipping of articles from publications available on any newsstand.”363 In holding
that they did not have standing to pursue their claim, the Supreme Court
emphasized the vagueness of the allegations. A “subjective ‘chill,’” based only
on a fear that the information collected might be used against them in the future,
was not sufficient; instead, the plaintiffs must show an actual injury.364
In Hassan, by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged that the NYPD was deliberately
and covertly spying on them because of their religious identity and provided
evidence that the surveillance had curbed their constitutionally-protected
356 See Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.1978) (“Although it may be assumed that the state
may arrange for photographing all suspicious persons entering the bank, it does not follow that its criterion for
selection may be racially based, in the absence of a proven compelling state interest.” (citation omitted)).
357 Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015).
358 Id. at 288.
359 Id. at 291.
360 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
361 Id. at 2–5.
362 Id. at 13.
363 Id. at 9 (quoting Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
364 Id. at 13–14.
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religious activities, including discussing their faith and worshipping at their
mosques.365 The Hassan court observed that “Laird doesn’t stand for the
proposition that public surveillance is . . . per se immune from constitutional
attack . . . .”366 Because the plaintiffs had alleged that the NYPD’s actions had
caused them “direct, ongoing, and immediate harm,” their First Amendment
claims were justiciable.367 The panel also emphasized that surveillance may not
be targeted on the basis of race or other protected categories, suggesting that
such surveillance would give rise to Equal Protection claims as well.368
Moreover, membership in a protected category (such as religion) is not
necessary for a court to find that surveillance implicates the First Amendment;
covert surveillance in retaliation for filing an employment discrimination claim
can suffice.369 As the Third Circuit observed in Anderson v. Davila, government
retaliation in response to exercise of the “right to petition the government for
grievances,” a “protected activity under the First Amendment,” is a “specific
present harm.”370 The point was borne out in a case involving a Wikileaks
volunteer whose electronic devices were seized at the U.S. border and retained
by the government for a month and a half.371 In House v. Napolitano, the court
affirmed that simply because an initial search is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment does not mean that government agents may “target someone for
their political association.”372
Thus, where political activists or religious adherents are dogged by
surveillance devices, be they cameras, drones, or other technologies, they will
have viable First Amendment claims if the potential harm rises above a vague
fear that the fruits of the surveillance may be used at some point in the future.
For instance, where the surveillance is targeted on the basis of religion, race, or
another protected category, or is undertaken in retaliation for other First
Amendment activity, viable First Amendment claims would exist. This is true
even if the surveillance merely deters association, protesting, or petitioning,
365

Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 288 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 292.
367 Id.; see also United States v. Gering, 716 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding mail covers targeting
minister at residence and church against First Amendment challenge in absence of showing that “mail covers
were improperly used and burdened . . . free exercise or associational rights”).
368 Hassan, 804 F.3d at 292 (“[I]n several post-Laird cases we have recognized that, while surveillance in
public places may not of itself violate any privacy right, it can still violate other rights that give rise to cognizable
harms.” (footnote omitted)).
369 Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 162 (3d Cir. 1997).
370 Id. at 160, 164.
371 House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816, at *1–3 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012).
372 Id. at *11.
366
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rather than blocking these activities outright, and even if the government does
not intend to cause specific harm. As the Supreme Court has observed,
“associational rights ‘are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack,
but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference’ and . . .
these rights can be abridged even by government actions that do not directly
restrict individuals’ ability to associate freely.”373
III. THEORY IN PRACTICE
This final Part offers several case studies to demonstrate how this approach
would play out in the context of specific surveillance technologies. While the
analysis will usually depend on the specific facts of the case (as do many Fourth
Amendment inquiries), these case studies endeavor to respond to and refute the
criticism that proponents of a more holistic approach to public space surveillance
do not grapple with the “what-if”—that is, the logical next step of setting out
when additional legal process would be required and how both the judiciary and
law enforcement would know when the requirement has been triggered.374
A. GPS Trackers on Cars
After United States v. Jones, physically attaching a GPS tracker
presumptively qualifies as a Fourth Amendment trespass.375 The question that
remains is how a court would analyze the use of GPS devices that are built-in or
not otherwise attached by law enforcement.
Duration: GPS tracking covering at least fourteen days is likely to trigger
constitutional scrutiny; such an extensive body of information can be used to
create a mosaic that conveys detailed personal information, chilling First
Amendment rights and risking exploitation by an unscrupulous governmental
agency or official. Where the monitoring is for a shorter period, one guiding
factor would be whether it is a period that would reasonably be expected to be
accomplished by the police without the use of cutting-edge technologies. If it
would not, then the duration should be placed on the search side of the scale.
Cost: GPS tracking is a paradigmatic form of surveillance that is many orders
of magnitude less expensive than assigning officers to follow someone. By
373 Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 485 U.S.
360, 367 n.5 (1988).
374 See Kerr, supra note 170, at 346 (“It [is] particularly telling that not even the proponents of the mosaic
theory have proposed answers for how the theory should apply.”).
375 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
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“evad[ing] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices,” including “limited police resources,” GPS upsets the usual curbs on
government overreach.376 The cost consideration should weigh strongly in favor
of finding GPS tracking, particularly of any significant duration, to be a Fourth
Amendment search.
Recording: GPS tracking will almost inevitably produce a record (such as
the 2000-page readout produced in Jones377), facilitating both the ability to draw
extensive inferences about the driver’s life and associations and the opportunity
to identify single, sensitive moments. The information will often be less richly
detailed than that offered by real-time cell phone tracking, since it will identify
where a person drove and parked but not necessarily the homes or businesses
that he or she entered (or where she traveled by foot or public transportation).
Nevertheless, if records indicate that a car is parked in front of a private home
on multiple occasions, it is reasonable to infer that the subject has a relationship
of some kind with people in the house. Where records reveal a person’s travels
throughout a day or a week, inferences can be drawn about where he or she lives,
worships, has intimate relationships, and more.
Presence in private home: Unlike a cell phone or other device carried on the
person, a car’s GPS device generally will not reveal an individual’s presence in
a private home, and this factor generally would not contribute to a finding of a
search. There are circumstances, however, in which a GPS could indicate this
information. Where a car is parked night after night in the same driveway, for
instance, a strong inference can be drawn—barring contrary information—that
the driver lives in that home (or has a relationship with the occupant). Or a car
might drive through a private gate and down a winding private road to a secluded
ranch, obscured from view by trees. While the presence of a car in a rural area
might, under normal circumstances, be discernible from air by a helicopter, a car
surrounded by natural features that help to shield it from view would not be.
GPS information, however, could reveal the location of the car. In that case—
and regardless of the duration of surveillance—the disclosure of otherwise
private information should be added to the ledger.
Erosion of core constitutional rights and combination of technologies:
Neither of these factors is likely to come into play in the context of GPS tracking,
at least in its current state. The analysis might change if, for instance, law

376
377

Id. at 956. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
Id. at 948.

LEVINSON-WALDMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

2/22/2017 1:18 PM

601

enforcement tried to access an OnStar-type unit that recorded the content of
conversations inside the car.
Conclusion: Given the significantly lowered cost of GPS monitoring and the
creation of a recording, GPS monitoring of any appreciable duration is likely to
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Because governmental GPS tracking
occurs almost exclusively for law enforcement purposes, police will be required
to obtain a warrant in advance. In light of the preference for clear, bright-line
rules to guide law enforcement, law enforcement agencies could require a
warrant for any GPS use, or direct that tracking for any period above a set
duration—say, six to eight hours—requires a warrant.378
Such a warrant would have to be tailored to focus on those locations for
which there is probable cause to believe that there is a connection between the
target and criminal activity. For instance, the warrant would need to target the
particular routes the target is believed to take to engage in the criminal activity,
or the locations of meetings between the target and suspected co-conspirators.
“Geofencing” capabilities, which turn off tracking technology when the device
leaves certain geographic boundaries, may be useful in this regard.379
B. Cell Phone Location Information
The dispositive feature of cell phone tracking, insofar as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned, is that it can reveal information from inside a private
home or other protected space that would otherwise be obtainable only with a
warrant. To be sure, cell phones can also enable intrusive monitoring for long
periods of time, at low cost, and create a recording of an individual’s daily
activities. But they are perhaps unique among the surveillance technologies for
their ability to disclose their possessor’s presence in a private home, regardless
of the duration of tracking.380 Moreover, law enforcement will rarely know in
advance when the owner is about to enter a private area, and thus generally will
not be able to cease tracking in advance to avoid capturing sensitive data.
378 An agency could also take into account the likelihood that the GPS will reveal constitutionally protected
information even in the absence of a long period of tracking. Thus, rural law enforcement agencies, serving
residents who are more apt to retreat to private and inaccessible spaces that would be accessed only via GPS,
might determine that a warrant is always the proper procedure in the absence of exigent circumstances.
379 See HTG Explains: What Geofencing Is (and Why You Should Be Using It), HOW-TO GEEK, http://
www.howtogeek.com/221077/htg-explains-what-geofencing-is-and-why-you-should-be-using-it/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2016).
380 See, e.g., In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1023 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Cell phones generate far more location data because, unlike the vehicle in Jones, cell
phones typically accompany the user wherever she goes.”).
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Regardless of duration, therefore, cell phone surveillance should presumptively
qualify as a Fourth Amendment search.
As with GPS tracking, a warrant for real-time cell phone tracking should be
tailored to obtain information that will lead to evidence of a crime, rather than
information about all places the person goes at all times of the day, every day.
Such a warrant might restrict the times at which the phone is tracked and the
length of tracking. Similarly, a warrant for historical cell site location
information should be focused on times and places for which there is probable
cause to believe there is evidence of a crime. Finally, a warrant for a Stingray
should be designed to limit the collection of data about innocent third parties
before the fact, as well as to purge any innocent persons’ data soon after
collection.
C. Fixed Surveillance Cameras
Once a surveillance camera is installed, it can be deployed for an array of
purposes. Because surveillance cameras are most frequently installed for general
public safety purposes, this case study will focus on using cameras to monitor
public areas.381
Duration: The durational factor is analyzed with respect to a single
individual—that is, whether a single person can be tracked for an appreciable
duration. A small number of cameras trained on a public area are highly unlikely
to monitor a single individual or group for an extended duration. Even where
they capture a public event such as a marathon or a protest, the length of the
surveillance is not likely to elevate it to a search. It is possible, of course, that a
mounted surveillance camera could view, over an extended period, an individual
who is carrying out an ongoing protest—for instance, the long-time (and now
defunct) anti-war encampment near the White House.382 If the surveillance
cameras have a concrete chilling effect on the protestors, they may have a standalone First Amendment claim. In addition, if cameras are networked with
cameras in other locations to allow for the easy tracking of an individual—
systems that are already in place in the British cities of London and Sheffield,

381 Where a camera is used for targeted tracking of an individual, the Fourth Amendment analysis will be
highly fact-dependent, with the duration of tracking constituting a significant factor.
382 Caitlin Gibson, Connie Picciotto Has Kept Vigil Near the White House for 32 Years. Why, and at What
Cost?, WASH. POST (May 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/05/02/conniepicciotto-has-kept-vigil-near-the-white-house-for-32-years-why-and-at-what-cost/.
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with New York City not far behind383—the Fourth Amendment would require
that there be policies in place to ensure that they are not used to track individuals
without a warrant (save in exigent circumstances).
Cost: Where the cameras are doing the work of only several police officers,
by monitoring a fairly small area, the cost may not be significantly less than
deploying the officers themselves, particularly when the work of monitoring the
cameras is taken into account.
Recording: Some cameras allow for monitoring in real-time, some record for
later review, and some do both. When a camera records in a public square for
later review, there are two concerns of potentially constitutional magnitude. The
first, of less serious concern, is that an individual person could be captured
multiple times on video if he or she regularly uses the square as a thoroughfare
or a place to carry out personal affairs or business. This possibility does not
trigger the durational consideration, however, as it still will not enable
individualized tracking over a long period of time or the creation of a mosaic
(unless the person literally conducts all of his or her business in and around the
limited area of the public square).
Perhaps the more salient concern is the ability to pick out and identify
individual, sensitive moments that would otherwise be lost to the natural passage
of time. Where biometric recognition technologies are deployed, the risk
becomes even more acute, as it becomes a simple matter to pick out a particular
face, a tattoo, or a style of walk weeks or even months after a person strolled
through the area. Not recording at all would, of course, eliminate this risk. Where
recording is enabled, stringent back-end restrictions would mitigate the threat as
a policy matter. For instance, limiting the length of recordings, the period of time
for which the video is kept, and the purposes to which it can be put, and also
prohibiting the use of automated recognition technologies without a warrant
could all serve as appropriate limitations.384 (As explained above, these backend restrictions would not mitigate the threat as a constitutional matter, since the
collection itself would still be unlimited.385)
383 See NOAM BIALE, ACLU, WHAT CRIMINOLOGISTS AND OTHERS STUDYING CAMERAS HAVE FOUND,
https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file708_35775.pdf (referencing London camera system);
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL, https://www.sheffield.gov.uk/in-yourarea/report_request/crime/cctv.html (last edited Dec. 12, 2016); Kelly, supra note 83; see also Dees, supra note
247; Parascandola & Moore, supra note 247.
384 See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE (2007),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/54.pdf.
385 See supra notes 381–84 and accompanying text.
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Presence in private home: A surveillance camera directed at a relatively
confined public area is unlikely to capture otherwise inaccessible information
about a private home or other constitutionally-protected area. In ordinary
circumstances, this factor will not contribute to a finding of a search.386
Erosion of core constitutional rights: Surveillance cameras may capture the
exercise of First Amendment rights: peaceful assemblies and protests are a
regular feature of some public squares, and where government buildings are
included, the cameras may observe—and could chill—individuals’ exercise of
their First Amendment right to petition the government.387 As a basic matter,
however, individuals have not traditionally enjoyed protection against being
observed by law enforcement at a protest, and the mere addition of technology
in this case, without more, would not erode a historically recognized right.
Surveillance cameras in public areas could also be used to pick up the content
of conversations. While surveillance cameras generally are not wired for sound,
they could be used to monitor a conversation in sign language or to read the
speakers’ lips, even where the speakers sit close to each other and turn their
bodies so as to bar interlopers or keep their voices low enough to be inaudible
to outsiders.388 Such surveillance would assuredly violate any reasonable
expectation of privacy, even if it did not trigger the other factors.
Combination with other technologies: Surveillance cameras can be outfitted
with supplementary technologies, including license plate readers and biometric
recognition technologies. As explained below, the addition of a license plate
reader for one-time reads would not elevate the use of the camera to a search if
the data is not stored for future use. Advanced biometric recognition capabilities
change the game more substantially, by impinging on the anonymity that many
people take for granted, and their use will warrant more scrutiny.
Conclusion: Taken together, these factors suggest that erecting a limited
number of cameras in a public space will not constitute a search if there are
386 Pole cameras aimed at a private backyard could, as the Vargas court observed, reveal an individual’s
movements in or near his home over a period of time in excess of what could reasonably be carried out by police
officers. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS,
at 22 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014). I do not, however, include pole cameras in the universe of surveillance cameras
in public space, since they are directed at a home’s curtilage, which is historically protected by the Constitution
as an adjunct to the home.
387 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
388 See supra Part III.B.5.
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restrictions on recording and the cameras are not used for longer-term,
networked tracking of individuals. Where one of these factors changes
significantly, the overall analysis will change as well.
The fact that surveillance cameras enable a range of surveillance capabilities
and are likely to become a permanent feature of the landscape calls for a
thoughtful process before putting them up. In Washington, D.C., for instance,
local legislation directs the chief of police to consider a set of enumerated factors
in evaluating requests for cameras.389 There must be community involvement at
multiple stages, and the police department is obligated to comply with certain
reporting requirements.390 In exigent circumstances, a camera can be deployed
without prior notice, but it must be removed when the circumstances are over
and post-deployment notice must be provided.391 This model suggests one
method of engaging the community, limiting the use of cameras, and providing
transparency about surveillance devices.
D. Drones for Public Safety
Duration: As with a surveillance camera, a drone that remains focused on a
discrete public area is unlikely to capture any individual for more than a brief
period of time. A drone may, however, have a much wider scope than a camera;
depending on the height of the drone and the resolution of the camera, it could
capture views of a whole neighborhood or even an entire town.392 In addition, it
is far easier to use a drone to track a single person, increasing the duration of
individual surveillance.393 Again, the inquiry would be a fact-intensive one,
389 See Use of CCTV to Combat Crime, 24 D.C. Reg. 2508.2 (directing the chief of police to consider “[t]he
number and type of calls for service” and “[a]ny crimes that were committed in the proposed CCTV camera
location,” requests made by the relevant Advisory Neighborhood Commission or a community group, and “any
other objectively verifiable information from which the Chief of Police may ascertain whether the health, safety,
or property of residents who live in the proposed”). Requests for cameras can come from police officers, district
commanders, or community groups, among others.
390 See Public Notification, 24 D.C. Reg. 2502.2 (requiring chief of police to provide notice and a range of
information about the cameras to the public before the device is put up, including system capabilities, how
cameras are used, length of deployment, and viewing area); Public Notification, 24 D.C. Reg. 2502.3; Public
Notification, 24 D.C. Reg. 2502.7–9; METRO POLICE DEP’T, ENHANCED USE OF CCTV TO COMBAT CRIME 4
(Aug. 9, 2006) (requiring District commanders who are requesting cameras to detail the contacts they have had
with relevant elected leaders (neighborhood commissioners and council members), and to justify the request).
391 Public Notification, 24 D.C. Reg. 2502.5.
392 Ellen Nakashima & Craig Whitlock, With Air Force’s Gorgon Drone ‘We Can See Everything’, WASH.
POST (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:09 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/01/
AR2011010102690.html.
393 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 93, at 16 (“[S]ome drones could theoretically ‘stay in the air forever.’
Unlike a stationary license plate tracker or video camera, drones can lock in on a target’s every move for days,
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depending on the surveillance that the police could be expected to undertake
under the circumstances, but the addition of a drone makes it a much simpler
matter to create a mosaic.394
Cost: The cost of using a drone is likely to vary according to the
circumstances, and the comparative cost of monitoring a public area will depend
significantly on the duration of surveillance. As against an already-mounted
surveillance camera, for instance, it will presumably be more expensive to send
and keep a drone aloft than simply watching an existing camera. As against a
team of officers, however, the comparative cost will depend on the drone’s
capabilities: a single drone watching a relatively limited area may not be much
more expensive than sending an officer to do the same job, while a drone that
can travel to high elevations to get a view of a large public area and zoom in to
get small-scale details may be able to do the job of a group of officers at far less
expense.
Recording: A drone hovering above a public space is almost certain to be
recording; the presence or absence of a recording would be added to the ledger
as appropriate.
Presence in private home: As with the other factors, this element of the
inquiry is likely to be quite fact-dependent, depending upon the drone’s
capabilities. A drone with viewing capabilities restricted to a relatively limited
public space (whether by policy or technology) is unlikely to glean information
about the inside of a home. On the other hand, a drone with the capacity to survey
a large area in high resolution may be able to simultaneously monitor a public
space and watch the goings-on inside a home, and a smaller drone could simply
leave the public space and peer inside a home, as a drone memorably did outside
Senator Dianne Feinstein’s home (leading her to call for a warrant requirement

and possible weeks and months. This ability to closely monitor an individual’s movements with pinpoint
accuracy may raise more significant constitutional concerns than some other types of surveillance technology.”).
394 Similarly, where drones are used for targeted tracking, the warrant requirement should come into play
more quickly than for surveillance cameras, since drones allow for more precise tracking, in places where an
officer may not be able to go, and are able to “see” inside a home more easily. See, e.g., ELEC. PRIVACY INFO.
CTR., supra note 246 (“Surveillance drones are equipped with sophisticated imaging technology that provides
the ability to obtain detailed photographs of terrain, people, homes, and even small objects. Gigapixel cameras
used to outfit drones are among the highest definition cameras available, and can ‘provide real-time video
streams at a rate of 10 frames a second.’ On some drones, operators can track up to 65 different targets across a
distance of 65 square miles.”); Kathryn A. Wolfe, Feinstein: Drone Inches from Face, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2014,
4:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/senator-dianne-feinstein-encounter-with-drone-technologyprivacy-surveillance-102233 (reporting on drone hovering outside Senator Feinstein’s house).
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for drones).395 The actual capabilities of the drone in question will guide the
court’s analysis in this realm.
Significantly, unlike with cell phones and GPS devices, where the target
himself holds the tracking device and law enforcement may have no way to
anticipate or avoid obtaining information from inside a home, law enforcement
agents will be piloting the drone and could avoid approaching a private area in
a manner that would intrude on constitutionally protected rights. Where law
enforcement knows in advance that their drone use may invade otherwise
constitutionally protected space, they should seek a warrant at the outset (or take
steps to avoid approaching a protected space).
Erosion of core constitutional rights and combination of technologies: If a
drone carries a technology that can pick up the content of conversations, or if an
additional device such as a license plate reader or cell phone tracker is installed
in the drone, then courts should take account of that in their analysis.
Conclusion: The combination of these factors—the ease with which a drone
can transition from general surveillance to individualized tracking and the
intrusive nature of mobile drone surveillance, among others—suggests that a
default warrant requirement for law enforcement drone use, whether for
investigative tracking or for public safety, would most vigorously protect Fourth
and First Amendment rights. In the absence of clear law, some states are taking
precisely this approach. Virginia’s Governor, for instance, recently signed a bill
requiring a warrant any time a law enforcement agency uses a drone, whether
for a criminal investigation or more generalized surveillance, and there have
been similar efforts in other states.396 Such a warrant could incorporate a
geofence to prevent the drone from straying outside prescribed boundaries,
making its range more akin to that of a surveillance camera, and altitude
395

Wolfe, supra note 394.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems; Use by Public Bodies During Execution of a Search Warrant, Exception,
S. 1301, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015) (enacted); Tim Cushing, Virginia Governor Signs Warrant
Requirement For Police Drone Use; Balks At Seven-Day Limit On ALPR Data Retention, TECH DIRT (May 7,
2015, 3:47 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150507/08315130923/virginia-governor-signs-warrantrequirement-police-drone-use-balks-seven-day-limit-alpr-data-retention.shtml; Zusha Elinson, Brown Vetoes
Bill Requiring Warrants for Drone Surveillance, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/california-governor-vetoes-bill-requiring-warrants-for-drone-surveillance-1412007285
(noting that a similar bill passed the California legislature with bipartisan support but was vetoed by Governor
Brown); Christopher Keating, Police Would Need Warrant to Launch Surveillance Drones, HARTFORD
COURANT (Apr. 7, 2015, 5:57 PM), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-drone-bill-passed-0408-20150407story.html (Connecticut); Michael Phillis, Bill Governing Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones Advances, PHILLY
VOICE (May, 15, 2015), http://www.phillyvoice.com/bill-governing-police-use-drones-advances/ (New Jersey).
396
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restrictions could be imposed up front to prevent a drone from executing
pervasive, widespread surveillance (or low-level, intrusive surveillance).
E. Automatic License Plate Readers
Duration: If the reader runs a plate or plates and then discards any plate that
doesn’t result in a “hit,” the duration of surveillance is essentially negligible. If
it sends the data to a database for retention, however, the duration may be much
longer. When license plates are routinely scanned by multiple readers and the
information is retained in a database for an appreciable period, the combined
mosaic effect of that location information can be used to yield far more personal
information than a single reading at a single point in time. A longer-term
database of automobile movements will have First Amendment implications as
well, whether the database is used to obtain multiple points of information about
a single car or to place multiple cars in the same place at various times,
suggesting patterns of association.
Cost: An automated license plate reader accomplishes collection and
analysis of information with a speed that would otherwise require a team of
officers at multiple points across a city and even across the country. Because it
carries out its mission through lightning-fast reading, translation, transmission,
and analysis of every plate that passes its station, achieving the same goals in a
non-automated fashion would be not only prohibitively expensive but also
essentially impossible. The cost factor thus weighs strongly in favor of a search
determination.
Recording: License plate readers can record information; the more they
record and the longer they keep the data, the greater the threats to individuals’
privacy. Recording more information should lead to a stronger presumption in
favor of a search.
Presence in private home: Most stationary license plate readers will not
detect information about a private home, as they are usually mounted in busier
urban areas, on thoroughfares in and out of town, etc. Readers could be mounted
in residential neighborhoods, however, or on patrol cars that drive through
residential areas. In one well-publicized example, a passing police car equipped
with a license plate reader took a picture of a car in a private driveway that
captured not only the license plate but an image of the owner and his two small
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children stepping out of the vehicle.397 This factor generally will not tip in favor
of a search finding, but a court would need to examine the particular
circumstances.
Erosion of core constitutional rights and combination of technologies: These
factors appear less likely to be salient when it comes to license plate readers.
Conclusion: This analysis suggests that when license plate readers store
information in a database for retention, as opposed to running plates against a
hot list and immediately discarding the plates that do not match, the use of the
reader is a search. Such storage is incontrovertibly for law enforcement
purposes: the reader collects information to aid law enforcement in finding
offenders and pursuing them for restitution or imprisonment. Fourth
Amendment doctrine would thus demand a warrant.
Using license plate readers to collect information about every car driving
past every license plate reader in the country, however, is incompatible with the
individualized suspicion and particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, and thus cannot be saved even with a warrant.398 Readers should
be used only for checks against hot lists, only if the information is immediately
purged, and only if there are careful restrictions and protections in place to guard
against abuse.
F. Body-Worn Cameras
Body-worn cameras are different from most of the other surveillance
technologies discussed here because, unlike the other technologies canvassed in
this article, they do not (at least in their current iteration) amplify the scope of
surveillance. That is to say, the camera sees only what the police officer sees,
and the camera is dependent upon the officer. In addition, the typical police
officer on a beat will have interactions with a range of individuals over the
course of her week; an officer generally does not interact with, and record, the
same person for days on end.
Body cameras nevertheless raise both constitutional and policy concerns that
warrant close attention to their use and detailed guidelines when they are
deployed. While a detailed policy discussion is beyond the scope of this Article,
397 See Ali Winston, License-Plate Readers Let Police Collect Millions of Records on Drivers, CTR. FOR
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (June 26, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/license-plate-readers-let-police-collectmillions-records-drivers-4883.
398 See supra Part II.C.1.
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the treatment below analyzes body cameras in the context of the multi-part
Fourth Amendment test and suggests some practical considerations.
Duration: An individual body-worn camera typically will not enable longterm surveillance; even if the camera records constantly, it will still be for no
longer than an individual police officer could observe a person or gathering,
since the camera will be affixed to an officer. Videos from multiple body-worn
cameras could be knitted together to create a mosaic, however, and could be
augmented with footage from other sources and biometric recognition
technology. The analysis will thus depend on the particular facts in question, but
a single body-worn camera recording is unlikely to trigger this factor.
Cost: The actual costs of police surveillance are the same with a body camera
or without; the individual officer is still walking the same beat, driving the same
route, and responding to the same calls, with all the expenses in personnel and
equipment that entails, whether she is equipped with a body camera or not. The
main contribution of the body camera is to produce a video record, as described
below. Body cameras are likely to lower other costs; where a defendant is caught
on camera clearly committing a crime, for instance, he or she may plead guilty
without going through the expense of a trial, and where a police officer is
revealed to have engaged in misconduct, settlements and policing reforms may
be achieved more quickly. But those costs are not salient to the preliminary
question of whether the use of the camera itself constitutes a search. Real-time
surveillance is no more or less expensive with a body camera attached.
Recording: By design, body cameras record when they are activated. Current
body camera designs primarily rely on the police officer to activate it, but
cameras that activate automatically in response to certain stimuli are already in
development and, in some places, on the streets.399 While the recordings may be
relatively limited in duration (at least with respect to the length of time a given
individual or group is captured), they may still create a “time machine” that
would allow for the retrieval of sensitive information or a moment that would
otherwise be anonymous.

399 See Digital Ally Receives VuLink Patent, Provides Automatic Body Cam Activation & In-Car Video
System Linking, EMS1.COM (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.ems1.com/ems-products/cameras-video/pressreleases/1977201-Digital-Ally-Receives-VuLink-Patent-Provides-Automatic-Body-Cam-Activation-In-CarVideo-System-Linking/; Ryan Mason, More Than a Body Cam, POLICE (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.
policemag.com/channel/technology/articles/2015/04/more-than-a-body-cam.aspx; Robert Maxwell, Lakeway
Police First to Use Automatic Body Cameras, KXAN-TV (June 12, 2015, 4:57 PM), http://kxan.com/
2015/06/12/lakeway-police-first-to-use-automatic-body-cameras/.

LEVINSON-WALDMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

2/22/2017 1:18 PM

611

That said, this concern is somewhat lessened when it comes to video of the
civilian with whom the officer is interacting. That interaction is hardly a private,
anonymous moment, since it is by definition being observed by a law
enforcement official already. Passersby may, however, object to being caught
incidentally on video. These concerns would counsel, as a policy matter, in favor
of redacting their faces and other identifying features if video is released
publicly, and would also counsel in favor of restricting the retention period of
video that is not evidence in a criminal case to a duration tied to the statute of
limitations for filing a civilian complaint.
Presence in private home: One of the most sensitive issues surrounding body
cameras is their use inside a private home. Most policies currently in force
provide for body cameras to remain on when police enter a private home,
whether in response to a call or because they are pursuing an escaping suspect.400
A minority of policies direct officers, when possible, to obtain consent of the
residents and to abide by a resident’s request to turn off the camera.401
Many of the same factors that counsel in favor of body cameras—increased
oversight of officer behavior, transparency regarding police-civilian
interactions—would generally suggest that cameras should record inside a home
as well, where it is even less likely that an outside observer would be in a position
to witness police (or civilian) abuse. Moreover, an officer inside a home will
generally have reason to be present, whether because she is executing a warrant
or because she has responded to a call for service. The body camera’s recording
is therefore unlike tracking of a cell phone, which captures information from
inside a home in the absence of a police officer who is authorized to be there.
At the same time, officers are not always inside a home for lawful reasons;
examples of police entries in error abound.402 In addition, a body camera
400 See, e.g., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS, S03-14 (2016), http://directives.chicagopolice.
DIEGO
POLICE
org/directives/data/a7a57b38-151f3872-56415-1f38-89ce6c22d026d090.html;
SAN
DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE (2016), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/149.pdf; see also Police Body
Camera Policies: Privacy and First Amendment Protections, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 3, 2016),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-policies-privacy-and-first-amendment-protections.
401 See, e.g., ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE 1140.0, MOBILE VIDEO RECORDING
SYSTEMS (2014), https://rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/FL/Orlando_BWC_Policy.pdf; SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T,
BODY-WORN VIDEO PILOT PROGRAM, 16.091 (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-16--patrol-operations/16091---body-worn-video-pilot-program.
402 See, e.g., Associated Press in Atlanta, Georgia Police Shoot Man and Kill His Dog After Responding to
Wrong House, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/01/
georgia-police-shoot-man-kill-dog-wrong-house; Vicki Brown, Man Dies in Police Raid on Wrong House, ABC
NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95475&page=1 (last visited Nov. 1, 2015); Nick Ochsner,
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captures a permanent record of the home and preserves it for later review, far
different from the usual scenario of a police officer entering a home for a
specified purpose and leaving at the close of the episode, without carrying out a
videotape of everything he or she has observed.
Finally, a body camera may record sensitive moments such as an officer’s
interaction with a victim of domestic violence. This can be powerful evidence
in support of prosecution in a domestic violence case, but it can equally dissuade
a victim from speaking to a police officer or even calling an officer to her home.
Where an officer is an invitee to a home and the resident is aware of the body
camera and does not request that it be turned off, its use would not appear to be
a search. When the officer is in the home pursuant to the occupant’s consent and
he or she does request that the camera be turned off, the request must be honored;
otherwise, the officer has exceeded the scope of the consent and his presence in
the home is transformed into a warrantless, illegal search.
In general, the multiplicity of considerations above counsels in favor of
caution and in favor of thoughtful, detailed polices regarding the circumstances
in which cameras may record inside a private home and the ability for victims
and others to request that the camera be turned off.
Erosion of core constitutional rights: Some research suggests that when
police officers don body cameras, the incidence of “socially desirable behavior”
goes up.403 This is a beneficial result in many ways, if incidences of violence go
down and courteous interactions increase. This effect may also, however, bear
on the free exercise of First Amendment rights, particularly including political
protest, which depends to some extent on the latitude to engage in behavior
outside of social norms. In this regard, the effect may, ironically, be mitigated
to some degree by the fact that the presence of police officers always imposes
some chilling effect; the addition of a body camera adds to that chill, but perhaps
not as much as long-term surveillance enabled by the technologies above.
Notably, body cameras may also help safeguard some historically protected
rights, including the right to be free from unequal treatment on the basis of race,

Albemarle PD Raids Wrong House, Residents Claim Damaged Property, WBTV (Nov. 3, 2015, 5:15 PM),
http://www.wbtv.com/story/30421120/albemarle-pd-raids-wrong-house-residents-claim-damaged-property.
403 POLICE FOUND., SELF-AWARENESS TO BEING WATCHED AND SOCIALLY-DESIRABLE BEHAVIOR: A FIELD
EXPERIMENT ON THE EFFECT OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS ON POLICE USE-OF-FORCE (2013), https://www.
policefoundation.org/publication/self-awareness-to-being-watched-and-socially-desirable-behavior-a-fieldexperiment-on-the-effect-of-body-worn-cameras-on-police-use-of-force/.
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by adding an extra layer of accountability and oversight to the daily practice of
policing. This category is thus a mixed bag.
Conclusion: Based on the factors above, the use of body-worn cameras does
not appear to rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search when they operate
independently. If the status quo changes—if the cameras are linked to form a
network, for instance, or if they are outfitted with biometric recognition
technology—the analysis could shift as well.
Moreover, regardless of the constitutional outcome, the use of body-worn
cameras does raise privacy concerns, since they record moments that would
otherwise be ephemeral; this is both their value and their drawback. Body-worn
cameras raise complicated questions regarding the privacy of multiple parties—
officers, victims, and suspects—and might make sources more hesitant to speak
to police officers confidentially. In addition, while officers may need to exercise
judgment about when to turn a camera on and off—when speaking to a victim
of domestic violence, for instance, or while speaking with a possible witness to
a shooting who fears repercussions to herself—officer discretion over the
operation of the camera threatens to undermine its effectiveness if officers are
permitted to selectively record certain elements of an interaction.404
Accordingly, police departments should—as a policy matter, if not a
constitutional one—have robust policies in place before deploying body-worn
cameras, even in a pilot program. These policies should include guidelines
regarding: when a camera may be turned on or off; whether officers must notify
each member of the public they interact with that they are fitted with a body
camera; how to handle video from a private residence; how to provide residents
who have invited an officer into their home with an opportunity to request that
the camera be turned off; the length of time for which non-evidentiary video
recordings may be kept; and circumstances under which the video can be
accessed both internally and by the public. Community input into the
development of these policies is essential to ensure that any concerns are aired
and the cameras meet the needs of the community.

404 See, e.g., Mateescu, Rosenblat & Boyd, supra note 120 (providing an overview of current state of play
regarding body-worn cameras and cataloguing questions about police camera programs on civil rights and civil
liberties); Martin Kaste, Police Departments Issuing Body Cameras Discover Drawbacks, NPR (Jan. 22, 2015,
6:57
PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2015/01/22/379095338/how-police-body-cameravideos-are-perceived-can-be-complicated; Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in
Place, a Win for All, ACLU (Mar. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/police-body-mountedcameras-right-policies-place-win-all.
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In addition, body cameras are likely to produce a rich store of data, even if
they are only turned on at designated times, and some video will need to be
retained for enough time to allow a citizen to make a complaint or a crime
captured on camera to be investigated and prosecuted. Back-end restrictions,
stringent oversight, and close attention to protections for First Amendment
activities will therefore be particularly critical.
Finally, a body camera with biometric recognition capabilities is a significant
technological enhancement, allowing the police officer to “see” more than she
could otherwise, and could be far more susceptible to abuse.405 Any policy on
body cameras should address and strictly limit the use of biometric recognition
technologies.
CONCLUSION
New technologies have changed the landscape of policing and surveillance.
What once took significant manpower can now be accomplished at the click of
a button. In the coming years, new technologies that are beyond our current
imaginings will surely be pressed into use.
Civilians and law enforcement alike benefit from the steady innovation of
new technologies and new applications. At the same time, these developments
can enable surveillance of a depth, and with an ease, that was simply
unimaginable even twenty years ago. There is a growing judicial consensus that
this state of affairs profoundly implicates the Fourth Amendment protections
that are fundamental to Americans’ individual rights, including the right to some
modicum of privacy and the right to associate, to speak, and to protest. At
present, however, this consensus is still somewhat unfocused, with courts
groping for firm principles to underpin their instincts. The six-part framework
outlined here would offer guideposts for courts undertaking that inquiry.
Would a bright-line rule be simplest? Undoubtedly, yes. But a bright-line
rule would also be woefully insufficient, excluding multiple circumstances in
which structural privacy and resource constraints would guarantee privacy and
even anonymity, and for which there is thus a strong instinct (judicial and
otherwise) in favor of constitutional protection. This Article instead offers an

405 This scenario is dependent upon facial recognition technology that is more sophisticated than the
technology currently known to be available, which generally relies on ideal visual circumstances that do not
exist on the ground.
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articulable and relatively predictable framework to assist in moving Fourth
Amendment protections into the digital age.

